Certificate revocation list distribution in vehicular ad hoc networks by Nowatkowski, Michael E.
 
CERTIFICATE REVOCATION LIST DISTRIBUTION IN 


























In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy in 













COPYRIGHT (C) 2010 BY MICHAEL E. NOWATKOWSKI  
 
CERTIFICATE REVOCATION LIST DISTRIBUTION IN 











Approved by:   
   
Dr. Henry L. Owen, III, Advisor 
School of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Raheem A. Beyah 
School of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
   
Dr. John A. Copeland 
School of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Michael P. Hunter 
School of Civil and Environmental 
Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
   
Dr. George F. Riley 
School of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
  
   
   




























 I want to begin by expressing my deepest thanks to Dr. Henry Owen for his 
guidance and mentoring during this entire process.  His ability to push without being 
pushy was invaluable to my completing all the requirements in the time I was allotted.  I 
would also like to extend my thanks to the members of my committee, Dr. Copeland, Dr. 
Riley, Dr. Beyah, and Dr. Hunter.  I appreciate your time and thoughtful comments. 
 I also need to thank many of my fellow students that assisted me over the past 
three years with my work and made lasting friendships: Chris Lee for spending many 
days exposing me to interesting research topics; Ying Xia, Kevin Fairbanks, Joe Benin 
and Selcuk Uluagac for all of the coding help; and Yusun Chang for all of the discussions 
about wireless protocols. 
 Many thanks to Revathi Balakrishnan for her help with GTNetS, and even more 
thanks to Dr. Riley, Josh Pelkey, Mathieu Lacage, and many, many others on the ns-3-
users list for their help with ns-3. 
 Thank you to the Army and especially to the Department of Electrical 
Engineering and Computer Science at the United States Military Academy, West Point, 
New York for giving me this incredible opportunity. 
  I would like to thank my wife Susie and my three children, Morgan, Thomas, and 
Caroline, for being so understanding during the past three years.  They were incredibly 
supportive of me, allowing me to work while they kept everything going.  I could not 
have accomplished this without their love and understanding. 
 Lastly, I must thank my parents for making me understand the value of education 
and perseverance.  They have always been here for me, encouraging me to succeed in 
everything I have done.  
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv 
LIST OF TABLES viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ix 
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS x 
SUMMARY xii 
CHAPTER 
1 INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 Motivation 1 
1.2 Contributions 2 
1.3 Roadmap for Dissertation 3 
2 VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORKS 4 
2.1 Introduction 4 
2.2 Privacy 9 
2.3 Public Key Infrastructure 10 
3 CERTIFICATE REVOCATION LIST 14 
3.1 CRL 14 
3.2 Pseudonyms 17 
3.3 Revocation Rate 22 
3.4 CRL Size 25 
3.5 Certificate Authority Regions 27 
3.6 The WAVE CRL 29 
 vi 
4 VANET EFFECTS ON CRL DISTRIBUTION 33 
4.1 Introduction 33 
4.2 Encoding Methods 33 
4.3 Available Channel Capacity 38 
5 CRL DISTRIBUTION METHODS 40 
5.1 Introduction 40 
5.2 Current Methods of CRL Distribution (Related Work) 41 
6 NEW METHODS OF DISTRIBUTION 49 
6.1 Most Pieces Broadcast 49 
6.2 Generation per Channel 53 
6.3 CRL Distribution Flow Chart 54 
7 SIMULATION METHOD 56 
7.1 Introduction 56 
7.2 ns-3 56 
7.3 Assumptions 56 
7.4 Common Simulation Settings 57 
7.5 Mobility Models 59 
7.6 Verification and Validation 65 
7.7 Design of Experiments 66 
8 SIMULATION RESULTS 70 
8.1 Evaluation Criteria 70 
8.2 Statistical Analysis 71 
8.3 Factor Experiment Results 73 
 vii 
8.4 Trace Mobility Model Results 78 
8.5 Comparison of Results 84 
9 CONCLUSION 85 
9.1 Recommendations 85 
9.2 Future Work 86 








LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table 1.  EDCA parameters in DSRC, number of slots. 7 
Table 2.  Size of elliptic curve elements, in bytes. 11 
Table 3.  Annual revocation rate triggers, 2005. 25 
Table 4.  Required pieces to download for a 2000-piece file with no coding methods 
used. 34 
Table 5.  Common simulation settings. 57 
Table 6.  Vehicle trace parameters. 62 
Table 7.  Experiment factors. 67 
Table 8.  Number of pieces required for CRL download based on various piece sizes. 68 
Table 9.  Most effective levels per factor. 73 
  
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 1.  Elements of a VANET. 5 
Figure 2.  DSRC channels. [62] 6 
Figure 3.  WAVE sync interval. [16] 6 
Figure 4.  Number of pseudonyms valid over a one year period for an average of two 
hours driven per day, with year-long lifetime or week-long lifetime. 20 
Figure 5.  Number of valid pseudonyms in an OBU per day. 21 
Figure 6.  Number of hourly revocations over varying pseudonym lifetimes. 27 
Figure 7.  WAVECRL elements. 30 
Figure 8.  Size of hourly CRL over varying pseudonym lifetimes. 31 
Figure 9.  Example of network coding generations. 37 
Figure 10.  Number of packets transmitted and throughput as a function of packet 
length for a single SCH interval. 39 
Figure 11.  Download time for a 1 megabyte file with different packet lengths. 39 
Figure 12.  CRL distribution in a VANET. 40 
Figure 13.  V2I and V2V integration in VANET. 44 
Figure 14.  Example of most pieces broadcast. 52 
Figure 15.  Flowchart for the simulation models. 55 
Figure 16.  Bouncing box RSU and OBU start positions with 50 OBUs. 60 
Figure 17.  Position traces from ns-3 output for the Switzerland maps. 63 
Figure 18: Comparison of simulation model to Code Torrent output. 66 
Figure 19.  Effect of piece selection on download time. 74 
Figure 20.  Effect of piece size on download time. 75 
Figure 21.  Effect of GPC channel selection method on download time. 76 
 x 
Figure 22.  Effect of number of GPC channels on download time and PDR. 77 
Figure 23.  Completion times for OBUs from Enge-Oberstrass with 520 OBUs. 78 
Figure 24.  Packet deliver ratio and normalized packet overhead for OBUs from Enge-
Oberstrass with 520 OBUs. 79 
Figure 25.  Number of transmitted and received pieces from Enge-Oberstrass with 520 
OBUs. 79 
Figure 26.  Completion times for OBUs from Enge-Oberstrass with 1705 OBUs. 80 
Figure 27.  Packet deliver ratio and normalized packet overhead for OBUs from Enge-
Oberstrass with 1705 OBUs. 81 
Figure 28.  Number of transmitted and received pieces from Enge-Oberstrass with 
1705 OBUs. 81 
Figure 29.  Completion times for OBUs from Hurgen-Jona with 1275 OBUs. 82 
Figure 30.  Packet deliver ratio and normalized packet overhead for OBUs from 
Hurgen-Jona with 1275 OBUs. 83 
Figure 31.  Number of transmitted and received pieces from Hurgen-Jona with 1275 
OBUs. 83 
Figure 32.  Comparison of completed OBUs during vehicle traces. 84 
Figure 33.  Trace file header information. 89 
Figure 34.  Sample from trace file hw-ct-hurgen-jona-1day.high.0.adj.mov. 90 
Figure 35.  Comparison of vehicle locations from the original trace file, the current ns-
2 trace reader, and the improved ns-2 trace reader. 91 
Figure 36:  Mobility trace from the output of ns-3 for a single node. 92 
 xi 
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ACRONYMS 
𝐷   Difference Between Sample Means 
S2  Sample Variance 
𝑌   Sample Mean 
t1-α/2, υ  Student-t distribution 
AC  Access Category 
ACID  Application Class Identifier 
ACM  Application Context Mark 
AIFS  Arbitration Inter-Frame Space 
CA  Certificate Authority 
CCH  Control Channel 
CRL  Certificate Revocation List 
CSMA/CA Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance 
CWmax  Contention Window Maximum Value 
CWmin  Contention Window Minimum Value 
DSRC  Dedicated Short Range Communication 
EDCA  Enhanced Distributed Channel Access 
ECDSA  Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
EPFL  Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne 
GPC  Generation per Channel 
IPV6  Internet Protocol version 6 
MAC  Medium Access Control 
MPB  Most Pieces Broadcast 
NPO  Normalized Packet Overhead 
OBU  On Board Unit 
 xii 
PDR  Packet Delivery Ratio 
PKI  Public Key Infrastructure 
RSU  Road Side Unit 
SCH  Service Channel 
TNB  Top N Broadcast 
V2I  Vehicle to Infrastructure 
V2V  Vehicle to Vehicle 
VANET  Vehicular Ad Hoc Network 
WAVE  Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment 
WBSS  WAVE Basic Service Set 
WSM  WAVE Short Message 
WSMP  WAVE Short Message Protocol 
 xiii 
SUMMARY 
 The objective of this research is to investigate improved methods for distributing 
certificate revocation lists (CRLs) in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs).  VANETs 
are a subset of mobile ad hoc networks composed of network-equipped vehicles and 
infrastructure points, which will allow vehicles to communicate with other vehicles and 
with roadside infrastructure points.  While sharing some of the same limitations of mobile 
ad hoc networks, such as lack of infrastructure and limited communications range, 
VANETs have several dissimilarities that make them a much different research area.  The 
main differences include the size of the network, the speed of the vehicles, and the 
network security concerns.  Confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, and availability are 
some of the standard goals of network security.  While confidentiality and authenticity at 
times seem in opposition to each other, VANET researchers have developed many 
methods for enhancing confidentiality while at the same time providing authenticity.  The 
method agreed upon for confidentiality and authenticity by most researchers and the 
IEEE 1609 working group is a public key infrastructure (PKI) system.  An important part 
of any PKI system is the revocation of certificates.  The revocation process, as well as the 
distribution of revocation information, is an open research problem for VANETs.  This 
research develops new methods of CRL distribution and compares them to existing 
methods proposed by other researchers.  The new methods show improved performance 






 Network communications equipment will be installed in vehicles and roadside 
infrastructure points.  The primary uses identified for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks 
(VANETs) are safety-related messages, transportation efficiency, and entertainment 
content [1].  The Vehicle Safety Communications-Applications consortium identified 
some potentially life-saving warnings, including: emergency electronic brake light, pre-
crash sensing, cooperative forward collision warning, left turn assistant, lane-change 
warning, traffic signal violation warning, curve speed warning, and stop sign movement 
assistant [2].  For security and safety reasons, messages must be authenticated to ensure 
that a legitimate member of the VANET sent the message.  This is especially critical for 
safety-related messages.  When a user sends out erroneous messages, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, other members of the VANET should ignore those 
messages to protect their safety.  Public key certificates are used for authentication to 
prevent attackers from causing harm.  Certificate revocation lists (CRLs), which contain 
the identification numbers of certificates that should be ignored, are distributed to all 
members of the VANET.  To protect the members of the VANET, these lists should be 
distributed as quickly and efficiently as possible without over-burdening the network.  
This research develops two methods for distributing CRLs more quickly and efficiently 
than other currently proposed methods. 
1.1 Motivation 
 Improving driving safety is seen as the most important reason for enabling the 
capability of vehicle to vehicle communication.  In 2008, there were 37,261 fatalities and 
over 2.3 million injuries caused by more than 5.8 million vehicle accidents [3].  For 2009, 
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33,963 fatalities occurred [4].  The estimated economic impact for vehicle crashes in 
2000 is estimated at $230 billion, of which $21 billion was paid using tax money, or 
about $200 per household [5].  After examination of the causes for vehicle accidents in 
2004, [6] estimates that vehicle-to-vehicle safety messages could have prevented or 
reduced the seriousness of about 66%, close to 4 million, of the crashes that year. 
 Transportation efficiency applications for VANET include re-routing traffic to 
avoid congestion, enhanced route guidance and navigation, green light optimal speed 
advisory, lane merging assistant, and tolling.  Information and entertainment application 
for VANET include mobile-Internet, point-of-interest notification, fuel consumption 
management, and vehicle diagnostics [1, 7]. 
 The messages exchanged in the VANET must be accurate and reliable for these 
applications to improve the safety, efficiency, and convenience of driving.  Protecting 
members of the VANET from misbehaving nodes — nodes which send out erroneous 
messages — is paramount.  Identifying misbehaving nodes and revoking their ability to 
send messages will contribute to the security of the VANET. 
1.2 Contributions 
 This work contributes several novel items to the VANET research community, as 
well as to the ad hoc network community.  The primary contribution is the development, 
simulation, and analysis of two methods for delivering CRLs in a VANET environment.  
These two methods are Most Pieces Broadcast (MPB), and Generation Per Channel 
(GPC).  These methods may be applicable for the distribution of large files in other forms 
of ad hoc networks as well.  Additional contributions include examining the lifetime of 
pseudonyms and their effect on CRL size, developing VANET modules in ns-3 for other 
researchers in the community to continue to develop, and providing a synopsis of the 
current state of the art for CRL distribution in VANETs.  After conducting an in-depth 
literature search, no other researchers are considering the multi-channel nature of 
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dedicated short range communication (DSRC) for the distribution of CRLs.  This 
research uses the multiple channels of DSRC to enable methods that greatly improve 
CRL distribution.  These methods are compared to other proposed methods in simulation 
using realistic vehicle mobility traces. 
1.3 Roadmap for Dissertation 
 This dissertation is organized into nine chapters plus an appendix.  Chapter 2 
introduces vehicular ad hoc networks, specifically discussing the physical and medium 
access control (MAC) layers, and privacy and security issues.  Chapter 3 discusses 
certificate revocation lists.  The use of certificates is central to this discussion, so they are 
discussed in the context of VANETs.  Chapter 4 looks at the relationship between 
VANETs and the CRL, examining the parameters involved with sending large files over 
a highly mobile network.  Chapter 5 discusses the specifics of distributing the CRL in a 
VANET from a practical point of view and looks at previous research in this area.  
Chapter 6 introduces the methods developed for examination in this body of work.  
Chapter 7 details the simulation parameters and modeling techniques used to generate 
data for analysis followed by the analysis of the data in Chapter 8.  The concluding 
remarks are in Chapter 9.  Details about incorporating the mobility model into ns-3 are 
included as Appendix A.  
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CHAPTER 2 
VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORKS 
 Vehicular ad hoc networks are a subset of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs).  
While sharing some of the same limitations, such as lack of infrastructure and limited 
communications range, they have several dissimilarities that make VANETs a much 
different research area; therefore, research done on MANETs is not completely 
applicable to VANETs.  VANETs are hosted on vehicles and fixed infrastructure points, 
so power and space for radio, storage, and processing units is not an issue, and the 
number of vehicles and their speed makes scalability difficult [8].  Hartenstein and 
Laberteaux in [1] discuss many practical difficulties in VANET research, including lack 
of communication coordination, dynamic network topology due to mobility and radio 
propagation limitations, as well as balancing security and privacy.  Confidentiality, in the 
forms of privacy and anonymity, becomes a very important issue.  In fact, IEEE Standard 
1609.2 [9] specifies that ―anonymity for end-users‖ is a required security service. 
2.1 Introduction 
 While consumer VANETs have not yet been deployed, the idea has been 
discussed by research groups, government agencies, and vehicle manufacturers for 
several years.  In the United States, the FCC designated a 75 MHz band in the 5.9 GHz 
range for this purpose in 1999 [10].  Several other countries have also apportioned 
frequencies for VANETs.  Currently, test beds in the United States and Europe [11-13] 
are fielding prototypes and testing some of the initial protocols.  The physical layer 
specification is called by different names, including Dedicated Short Range 
Communication (DSRC) and Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE). 
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2.1.1 IEEE 1609 Standards 
 The IEEE P1609 working group has developed and issued a series of Trial-Use 
Standards for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE).  Vehicle-to-vehicle 
(V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication are accomplished using 
Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC), which is covered in the IEEE Standard 
P802.11p and the IEEE Standard 1609 series.  This standard has four main parts, 
covering the application layer [14], security services [9], multichannel operation [15], and 
network services [16].  IEEE 1609 uses IEEE P802.11p and DSRC as the WAVE 
protocols.  Two devices are defined in the 1609 standard: a roadside unit (RSU) and an 
on-board unit (OBU) [14].  Figure 1 shows the elements of a VANET. 
2.1.2 Physical Layer Standard 
 IEEE 802.11p [17] is a draft IEEE standard for vehicular communication as an 
amendment to the IEEE 802.11 standard [18].  The 802.11p standard is specifically for 
wireless access in vehicular environments and covers many aspects of the physical and 
MAC layer protocols for this case.  Two different classes of channels are described for 
use in DSRC/WAVE.  The first channel class is the control channel, referred to as CCH, 
 
 




which is a single channel "reserved for short, high-priority application and system control 
messages [15]."  OBUs transmit beacons at regular intervals on the CCH, usually 10 
beacons per second.  The beacons broadcast information about the location, speed, and 
direction of the vehicles.  This information is used for safety-related and network-related 
uses.  The other channel class is the service channel, or SCH, which has six different 10 
MHz channels that support a wider range of applications and data transfer.  The channel 
layout for DSRC is shown in Figure 2. 
 Each node in the VANET must monitor the CCH during time periods designated 
as control channel intervals.  Each CCH interval and SCH interval is 50 milliseconds in 
duration.  The time period for an entire CCH Interval and SCH Interval is 100 
milliseconds in duration and is called a Sync Interval (see Figure 3).  Between CCH 
intervals, nodes may choose to participate on a SCH for applications such as file 
downloads, navigation updates, or other applications. 
 A guard interval is placed at the beginning of each CCH and SCH interval to 
assist in channel synchronization for all the nodes in the VANET.  This guard interval 
allows for possible "variations in channel interval time and timing inaccuracies [16]."  
Annex D of IEEE 1609.4 specifies the parameters for the sync intervals and the guard 
 




Figure 3.  WAVE sync interval. [16] 
CCH Interval SCH Interval CCH Interval SCH Interval
Sync Interval (100 milliseconds)
Time
Guard Interval (4 milliseconds)
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interval.  The guard interval is the "SyncTolerance" value plus the "MaxChSwitchTime" 
value.  Both of these values are 2 milliseconds by default, for a total guard interval time 
of 4 milliseconds.  This leaves 46 milliseconds for transmissions in the CCH and SCH 
intervals.  A medium busy signal is set during the guard interval to prevent stations from 
transmitting during this time.  The medium busy signal also prevents stations from 
transmitting immediately at the end of the guard interval, forcing the stations into a 
random contention window selection at the start of each interval. 
2.1.3 Medium Access Control (MAC) Layer Standard 
 Packet collisions and poor radio reception are the primary causes for nodes not 
receiving data sent over a wireless medium.  DSRC uses carrier sense multiple 
access/collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) to reduce the number of collisions and to allow 
fair access to the medium.  Each node using CSMA/CA must first sense the medium to 
 
 
Table 1.  EDCA parameters in DSRC, number of slots. 
Slot time is 16 microseconds, aCWmin = 15, aCWmax = 511. 
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determine if the medium is idle or busy.  When the medium is idle, nodes wait for a fixed 
arbitration inter-frame space (AIFS) time plus a random time between zero and the 
minimum contention window value (CWmin) before sending data.  Transmission 
prioritization in DSRC is scheduled using Enhanced Distributed Channel Access (EDCA) 
based on the IEEE Standard 802.11e, described in [18, 19].  EDCA specifies four 
different access categories (ACs) for different priorities of data.  The CCH and SCH have 
slightly different parameters for the different ACs.  Table 1 shows the values of the 
contention window timers and the AIFS timers for the CCH and SCH over the different 
ACs.  The slot time, as described in [16], is 16 microseconds. 
 Broadcast mode sends data to the network broadcast address instead of to a 
specific destination address.  The data is not sent to a specific destination but rather to 
every node that is within radio range of the sender.  The ready-to-send (RTS) and clear-
to-send (CTS) handshake used for point-to-point data transmission is not used in 
broadcast mode.  The RTS/CTS handshake is an attempt to reduce the number of 
collisions resulting from the hidden terminal problem.  Acknowledgements (ACKs) are 
also not sent by receiving nodes when broadcast mode is used.  Therefore, since there is 
no RTS, CTS, or ACK when using broadcast mode, channel overhead is reduced since 
fewer transmissions are needed to complete a data transfer.  This allows for a potentially 
greater throughput of data.  However, there is no confirmation that the data was 
successfully received by any destination, and there is a higher risk of collisions due to 
hidden terminals [20]. 
2.1.4 Network Layer Standards 
 WAVE supports two different network layer protocols, IPv6 and the WAVE short 
message protocol (WSMP).  IPv6 traffic is not allowed on the CCH, but WSMP traffic is 
allowed on both the CCH and the SCHs.  The WSMP does not use a MAC address or IP 
address to identify the source or destination.  Instead, WSMP uses an Application Class 
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IDentifier (ACID) and an Application Context Mark (ACM) to identify the application 
class and the instance of the application class, respectively [9].  This helps to increase the 
level of user anonymity since the MAC address and IP address could be used to identify 
nodes and their presence in the VANET.  A WAVE Short Message (WSM) is a message 
format used for sending messages using the WSMP.  WSMP also serves as the transport 
layer protocol, replacing TCP and UDP for these messages.  WSMs may be sent on either 
the CCH or the SCHs.  According to [9], a certificate revocation list (CRL) shall be 
transmitted as a WSM.  The WSM header is 22 bytes in length [15], compared to 40 
bytes for the IPv6 header plus 8 more bytes for the UDP header. 
2.2 Privacy 
 The members of the VANET will be made up of publicly and privately-owned 
vehicles.  Private citizens using WAVE applications will have some expectation of 
privacy while operating their vehicles.  IEEE 1609.2 already specifies that privacy is a 
required service for WAVE applications.  The standard defines the term anonymity in the 
context of privacy, stating that "broadcast transmissions from a vehicle operated by a 
private citizen should not leak information that can be used to identify that vehicle to 
unauthorized recipients [9]."  More specifically, the ability to link two or more messages 
from the same sender must become more difficult as the time and distance between 
messages increases; however, the ability to authenticate the sender of the message as a 
valid member of the VANET must also be accomplished.  The requirements for 
anonymity and authentication are in the standard, but the methods to provide both at the 
same time are not covered.  The rest of this chapter explains more about the need for 
privacy, and some suggested methods from other researchers for providing anonymous 
authentication.  
 10 
2.3 Public Key Infrastructure 
 The main components of a public key infrastructure are the users, the certificates, 
and the certificate authority (CA).  Private keys are used to cryptographically sign 
messages that can be authenticated using the matching public key.  Public key certificates 
are used for authentication to prevent attackers from causing harm.  Cryptographically 
signed messages also provide message integrity; any changes to the message will cause 
signature verification to fail.  Certificates normally have a time period for which they are 
valid, defined by a start time and an end time, or simply a lifetime [21]. 
 The encryption algorithm specified for use in VANETs by IEEE Standard 1609.2 
is elliptic curve encryption, specifically, the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm 
(ECDSA).  Both 224-bit and 256-bit key sizes are allowed in the standard.  OBUs use 
224-bit keys, while CAs and RSUs use 256-bit keys. 
2.3.1 Certificates 
 Certificates are ―data structures that bind public key values to subjects [21].‖  In 
other words, a certificate is proof that a public key belongs to a certain user.  The 
certificate authority (CA) generates certificates upon a request from an individual user.  
The CA is a trusted source that cryptographically signs a user’s public key, thus creating 
a certificate for the user.  The user must trust at least one CA in order to validate 
certificates; thus, a user that places trust in the CA can also trust that objects signed by 
the CA are trustworthy. 
 Researchers have discussed several issues pertaining to the trade-offs between 
privacy (confidentiality) and authenticity [22].  Pseudonyms have been proposed as a 
method to handle the opposing requirements of non-anonymous authentication and end-
user anonymity.  A pseudonym is a short-lifetime certificate that does not contain 
identity-linking information.  Users request pseudonyms from a CA using a longer-
lifetime certificate, such as the electronic chassis number or electronic license plate 
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Table 2.  Size of elliptic curve elements, in bytes. 




Public Key 33 29 
Private Key 32 28 
Signature 64 56 
Certificate 135 125 
Signed Message Overhead 
using Certificate 
237 219 
Certificate ID 10 8 
Signed Message Overhead 
using Certificate ID 
110 108 
Pseudonym Size Not Applicable 153 
 
 
suggested by [8].  The CA that generated the pseudonym holds the linking information in 
escrow in case of a legal necessity for proving the identity of the pseudonym owner.  
Changing pseudonyms periodically greatly increases end-user anonymity while still 
maintaining a reliable means of authentication.  1609.2 includes the specification for the 
use of non-anonymous authentication using certificates and elliptic curve digital signature 
algorithms (ECDSA), certificate revocation lists, and end-user anonymity, as described in 
Annex D.3.3 of the standard. 
 Every certificate issued by a CA must have a certificate identification number to 
identify the certificate.  The CA generates the certificate identification number by 
calculating the SHA-256 hash of the certificate.  The resulting size of the certificate 
identification number can be either 64 or 80 bits according to IEEE 1609.2 [9]. 
 Using 224-bit ECDSA for OBUs, the current size of an OBU signing certificate is 
125 bytes, 29 bytes of which are the OBU public key.  The size of the private key 
associated with an end-user certificate is 28 bytes.  For every pseudonym stored, the 
certificate and private key must be stored; therefore, 153 bytes of memory are required in 
the OBU to store the certificate and the private key associated with that certificate.  Table 
2 summarizes these numbers.  The size of the pseudonyms is important because an OBU 
will change pseudonyms frequently to prevent others from tracking the vehicle's location.  
 12 
The OBU must store enough pseudonyms to change pseudonyms about every minute 
while driving, according to Raya, Papadimitratos, and Hubaux in [23].  This equates to 
about 43,800 pseudonyms per year for an average of two hours of driving per day.  Haas, 
Hu, and Laberteaux in [24] recommend changing pseudonyms every 10 minutes, and 
driving 15 hours per week.  This equates to 4,660 pseudonyms per year, but they 
recommend storing five years of pseudonyms for a total of about 25,000 pseudonyms per 
OBU. 
2.3.2 Threat Model to Privacy in VANET 
 One threat to privacy in VANETs is tracking a vehicle based on its radio 
transmissions.  Vehicles will broadcast beacons, safety messages, and other application 
messages regularly.  Any other vehicle in range is capable of storing these messages due 
to the broadcast nature of WAVE.  The beacons and safety messages will require 
cryptographic signing of the message to prove authenticity and membership in the 
VANET.  The identification sent with signed messages, known as the certificate, is 
enough to link messages sent by the same vehicle [25-27]; thus, while certificates provide 
a means for authentication, they do not provide privacy when the same certificate is used 
for a prolonged period, this the need for pseudonyms in VANETs. 
2.3.3 Trade-offs: Security versus Privacy 
 While frequent changes of pseudonyms will help to protect the identity of the 
user, it also makes security more challenging.  The ability to identify misbehaving users 
becomes much more challenging since the identity of the misbehaving user will change 
rapidly; thus it is difficult to identify a series of erroneous messages as originating from 
the same user. 
 There is also the difficulty of merely changing pseudonyms so that the change is 
not able to be tracked.  Unless the change is coordinated in some way with surrounding 
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nodes, the change of a single vehicle's pseudonym can be detected.  "Mix zones" [25] 
have been proposed as a way to conceal the pseudonym change.  The mix zone method 
requires groups of vehicles to coordinate when the pseudonym change will take place.  A 
simplified way to accomplish the pseudonym change would be to synchronize the 
pseudonym change with the change from CCH to SCH (or between SCH and CCH), 




CERTIFICATE REVOCATION LIST 
3.1 CRL 
 When a node’s certificate is identified for revocation, the currently used 
certificate must be revoked along with every pseudonym stored in that OBU.  This 
assumes that whatever caused the current certificate to be revoked will cause future uses 
of certificates by the same node to also trigger a revocation.  Examples that would cause 
this event include a malfunction in the vehicle’s sensors causing erroneous warning 
messages to other vehicles, or malicious activity by a given vehicle. By revoking all of 
the pseudonyms, further damage is avoided.  The information regarding which 
certificates are no longer valid, i.e., revoked, is sent out in a certificate revocation list 
(CRL).  The size of the CRL is directly proportional to the revocation rate, the number of 
nodes in the system, and, for VANETs, the number of pseudonyms used by each vehicle. 
In 1609.2, the CRL is referred to as the WAVECRL.  Actual WAVECRL sizes have been 
discussed briefly in the literature [28, 29].  Several authors have discussed issues with 
managing pseudonyms, certificate life-time, and certificate revocation methods, such as 
in [8, 25, 28, 30-34].  Eichler, in [35], examines revocation in an ad hoc network, but 
only looks at 100,000 nodes with an assumed 10% annual revocation rate.  Also, his work 
does not take into account VANET conditions. 
 The literature makes the assertion that the security of the VANET is improved if 
participants receive timely revocation information, most notably by distributing the CRL 
as quickly as possible.  The common theme among discussed methods to reduce 
distribution time is to reduce the size of the CRL, since smaller files can be distributed 
more quickly.  Methods for reducing the CRL file size include limiting the cases where 
revocation is needed and using fewer pseudonyms per vehicle 
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 A certificate revocation list (CRL) is a list of certificate identification numbers 
that are no longer valid prior to the expiration date of the certificate.  The lists are 
generated and issued by either the actual CA or an entity authorized by the CA.  The CRL 
is cryptographically signed by the CA or authorized entity, so the communication channel 
and storage medium do not need to be secure since any modification to the CRL during 
transmission or by other nodes will result in signature validation failure.  The CRL is 
published publicly at a time interval specified by the particular revocation policy.  This 
time interval may be regular, such as hourly, weekly, or monthly, or it may be based on 
measures other than time, such as a certain number of revocations.  The information 
contained in a CRL includes the expiration date of the CRL, the next time the CRL will 
be published, and the list of revoked certificates.  Each user maintains the CRL and 
checks the list as part of the message verification process. 
 In a situation where the rate of revocation is very low, the full and complete CRL 
will be small and will not change often.  Conversely, in a situation where the rate of 
revocation is high, the full and complete CRL will be large and will change often.  The 
cost, in terms of network resources, of transmitting the full and complete CRL in the 
second situation will be much higher than in the first situation.  A method for reducing 
the size of CRL information involves sending periodic updates instead of the entire list.  
Some of the variations of this method are Delta CRL and Over-Issued CRL, discussed in 
[36, 37].  Arnes completed a very detailed study of CRL policies in [36].  Partitioned 
CRLs and Bloom filters are another way of reducing the size of the CRL information 
distributed.  
3.1.1 Base CRL 
 The basic method for distributing CRL information is to distribute the entire list at 
a specified interval.  This method requires the greatest amount of transmitted information 
to ensure that nodes have the most recent CRL.  The last full and complete CRL is 
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referred to as the base CRL [21, 36].  The base CRL contains a list of every revoked 
certificate from a single CA. 
3.1.2 Delta CRL 
 To reduce the high cost of sending out a new base CRL at every update period, 
the CRL issuer may transmit only the changes to the base CRL.  This method is referred 
to as Delta CRL.  The base CRL is issued at a regular interval that is much greater than 
the Delta CRL issuance interval.  This greatly reduces the amount of revocation 
information that must be sent.  For example, a base CRL could be sent the first day of 
each month, with daily Delta CRLs that contained only the changes from the base CRL.  
The size of the Delta CRL increases over time as more changes are added from the base 
CRL. 
3.1.3 Over-Issued CRL 
 Over-Issued CRL is similar to Delta CRL, but instead of issuing only at regular 
intervals, updates are issued multiple times with over-lapping effective periods.  This 
means that a new CRL will be issued before the normal CRL publication time interval is 
reached.  A variation of this method has been used recently by Haas, Hu, and Laberteaux 
[24] where every revocation is treated as an update to the base CRL. 
3.1.4 Partitioned CRL 
 Partitioned CRLs are presented in [9] as a different method for reducing the size 
of the CRL.  This is a method of organizing certificates into groups to establish a 
hierarchy of certificates to speed up the distribution and searching of CRLs.  The groups 
are established by the CA and designated in the certificate series field.  The certificate 
series is checked first before searching the rest of the CRL.  This could be useful for 
allowing a single CA to partition a large geographic region of coverage into smaller, 
geographically different sub-regions. 
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3.1.5 Compressed CRL (Bloom Filter) 
 A different way of reducing the size of the CRL involves using types of 
compression techniques.  One method for compressing the CRL information using Bloom 
filters was introduced by Raya, et al. in [38] and further explored in [25, 32].  In this 
method, each certificate that is revoked is hashed to a fixed number of bits several times.  
The resulting hash value for each revoked certificate forms a type of signature.  The 
signatures of several revoked certificates can be combined into a single bit sequence that 
serves as the Bloom filter.  Each time a certificate is received, the same hashes are 
performed and the resulting value is checked against the Bloom filter.  If the signature 
matches a pattern in the Bloom filter, that means the certificate has been revoked with 
high probability.  Storing CRL information in this manner compresses the size of the 
CRL considerably since a fixed-length Bloom filter is distributed instead of distributing 8 
to 14 bytes for every certificate that is revoked.  In [24], Haas, Hu, and Laberteaux 
examine this method in much more detail.  There is a small probability of a false positive 
occurring when using this method due to hash collisions, which increases as more 
certificates are added to the Bloom filter.  [24] suggests testing a new pseudonym against 
the currently-possessed Bloom filter to see if the new pseudonym tests positive (revoked) 
using the Bloom filter.  If the pseudonym does test positive, the user should discard the 
pseudonym and try a different one. 
3.2 Pseudonyms 
 For security and safety reasons, messages must be authenticated to ensure that 
they were sent by a legitimate member of the VANET.  This is especially critical for 
safety-related messages.  Public key certificates are used for authentication to prevent 
attackers from causing harm.  Certificates normally have a time period for which they are 
valid, defined by a start time and an end time, or simply a ―lifetime.‖ 
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 Because of the opposing requirements of non-anonymous authentication and end-
user anonymity, pseudonyms have been proposed as a method to handle these 
requirements.  A pseudonym is a short-lifetime certificate that does not contain identity-
linking information.  Pseudonyms are requested from a certificate authority (CA) using a 
longer lifetime certificate.  The linking information is held in escrow by the CA that 
generated the pseudonym in case of legal necessity for proving the identity of the 
pseudonym user.  Changing pseudonyms periodically greatly increases end-user 
anonymity while still maintaining a reliable means of authentication.  While several 
researchers have proposed novel ideas for generating pseudonyms when needed, their 
ideas depend on an established and dense infrastructure to support pseudonym 
distribution [25, 30, 31, 34].  They suggest that OBUs can request new pseudonyms from 
RSUs whenever new pseudonyms are needed. 
 Since pseudonyms would ideally have a very short lifetime, on the order of 
minutes or hours, vehicles must either store large quantities of pseudonyms or make 
frequent requests for small quantities of pseudonyms.  Until sufficient infrastructure is 
available to support spontaneous pseudonym delivery, users will likely have to store large 
quantities of pseudonyms in the OBU to preserve anonymity rather than relying on the 
network for distribution.  Distributing pseudonyms from RSUs will increase the amount 
of network traffic, reducing the capacity for other information to be transmitted on the 
VANET. 
3.2.1 Need for Pseudonyms 
 Vehicles need pseudonyms to protect their privacy, especially their location 
information.  If the vehicle used the same certificate all the time, anyone could track the 
vehicle simply by watching where that certificate is used in the network.  This is also 
why vehicles need new pseudonyms when entering a new CA region.  Researchers have 
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examined this situation in some detail, going so far as to recommend changing 
pseudonyms in "mix zones" [25, 39]. 
3.2.2 Quantity of Pseudonyms 
 Raya and Hubaux in [8] propose changing pseudonyms about every minute while 
driving.  They estimate an average driving time of two hours per day.  This yields about 
43,800 pseudonyms for a year (120*365), which would require almost 7 megabytes of 
storage memory using 157 bytes per pseudonym.  With a limited amount of 
infrastructure, real-time distribution of new pseudonyms through RSUs is not realistic.  A 
consumer cannot be expected to return to a predetermined location every few days to 
reload their certificate store.  Therefore, a large number of pseudonyms will need to be 
stored in the OBU for the convenience of the consumer. 
 X.509 certificates include validity fields for ―not before‖ and ―not after‖ [21] to 
specify their lifetime.  The current trial-use version of 1609.2 specifies a format for the 
WAVE Certificate that includes a four byte certificate expiration date, but does not 
include a field for the beginning of the validity period.  This means that certificates are 
valid as soon as they are generated by the CA.  We propose adding four bytes to the 
WAVE Certificate for a ―valid after‖ field to enable the generation of limited lifetime 
pseudonyms. 
 An assumption that has been made in some previous papers is that pseudonyms 
issued by a CA at vehicle registration time are valid for an entire year.  However, these 
pseudonyms do not necessarily have to be valid for an entire year.  Instead, a lifetime 
could be specified for individual pseudonyms using the proposed ―valid after‖ and 
expiration fields in the WAVE Certificate.  Pseudonym lifetimes from one minute to one 
year could be specified at the time of generation by the CA. 
 For example, if a driver requests enough pseudonyms for two hours of driving 
every day of the year, the CA will generate 120 pseudonyms for each day of the year for 
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a total of 43,800 pseudonyms.  If the pseudonyms all had a lifetime of one year, they 
would all be valid at any time during the entire year.  However, if the CA generated 
pseudonyms with lifetimes of one week, the driver would have 840 valid pseudonyms to 
use anytime during each week, as shown in Figure 4.  At the end of week 1, any of the 
840 pseudonyms that were not used would expire and be deleted from the OBU.  Thus, 
during each week, only 840 pseudonyms are considered valid due to their ―valid after‖ 
and expiration field values.  This also means that only 840 certificates would need to be 
on the CRL for each vehicle, instead of 43,800 for a vehicle with year-lifetime 
pseudonyms. 
 This has the benefit of limited lifetime pseudonyms without the requirement for 
extensive infrastructure or the added burden on the VANET to generate and transmit 
spontaneous pseudonyms.  At each pseudonym refill, the OBU is loaded with a year of 
limited lifetime pseudonyms to preclude the driver from having to return to a pseudonym 
distribution point at frequent intervals. 
 When the lifetime of the pseudonym is less than one day, 1440 pseudonyms must 
be generated and stored to cover each minute of the 24 hour period since the owner will 
not know at the time of pseudonym generation which two hours of the day the 
pseudonyms will be used.  This would also require the generation and storage of 
1440*365 = 525,600 pseudonyms for the year, which is not very practical. 
 The private key and certificate are deleted from the OBU upon expiration and 
when a new pseudonym is selected for use.  This means that the total number of 
pseudonyms remaining in the OBU decreases over time.  The number of valid 
Week number 1 2 3 … 50 51 52 
Year lifetime  43,800 
Week lifetime 840 840 840 … 840 840 840 
Figure 4.  Number of pseudonyms valid over a one year period for an average of two 
hours driven per day, with year-long lifetime or week-long lifetime. 
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pseudonyms with a lifetime of one year stored in an OBU is expressed in (1), and shown 
graphically in Figure 5 on the top. 
POBU Number of pseudonyms stored in the OBU 
d Number of days since the last annual pseudonym refill 
Pused Number of pseudonyms used per minute of driving 
Mdriven Number of minutes per day for which the vehicle has requested pseudonyms 
 
 POBU = (365 – d) · Pused · Mdriven (1) 
 Shorter pseudonym lifetimes are available when the ―valid after‖ field is added to 
the WAVE Certificate; therefore, a general form of (1), where LT is the pseudonym 
lifetime in days, is shown in (2), and graphically in Figure 5 on the bottom.  The 
 
 
Figure 5.  Number of valid pseudonyms in an OBU per day. 
Lifetime is year-long (top), month-long, week-long, day-long, or hour-long (bottom), 














































































immediate reduction in the number of valid pseudonyms present in the OBU is clearly 
visible. 
 POBU = (LT – d mod(LT)) · Pused · Mdriven (2) 
3.2.3 Obtaining New Pseudonyms 
 Researchers have suggested several methods for obtaining pseudonyms, such as 
yearly refills at the Department of Motor Vehicles, periodic refills at locations such as a 
gas station, referred to as an "info-fueling station [40]," and pseudonym on demand [39], 
where pseudonyms are requested and delivered while driving.  The latter two methods 
require the support of RSUs to generate and distribute certificates. 
3.3 Revocation Rate 
 The process of invalidating the certificate is called certificate revocation.  
Revocation occurs when a certificate needs to be invalidated before the expiration date of 
the certificate.  Revocation informs a user attempting to validate a public key that the 
private key associated with the public key is no longer valid.  When a vehicle’s messages 
become untrustworthy in some fashion, whether by malicious acts, private key 
compromise, or equipment failure, the certificate that vehicle uses to verify its identity 
and trustworthiness must not be allowed to be considered valid anymore.  Other reasons 
for revocation may include changing of vehicle ownership from car sales, thefts, or 
rentals.  While changes to vehicle ownership may not actually trigger a revocation when 
VANETs are implemented, this study does look at that possibility in order to show the 
extent to which certificate revocation may affect the VANET.  We will refer to vehicles 
that have certificates requiring revocation as "misbehaving."  This term encompasses all 
reasons for revocation.   
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3.3.1 Malicious Activity 
 This category includes users that intend to influence the behavior of other vehicles 
in the VANET, either directly or indirectly.  Direct measures are events such as sending 
fake location messages, false safety messages that cause other vehicles to brake suddenly, 
or traffic information that is incorrect, causing vehicles to alter their travel routes.  The 
rate of malicious activity represents the greatest degree of uncertainty.  With the wide 
variety of applications made possible by VANETs, it is highly likely that someone will 
attempt to take advantage of the system and its users.  In [22], Parno and Perrig describe 
several categories of such adversaries, including greedy drivers, snoops, pranksters, 
industrial insiders, and malicious attackers.  A large range of activities are described in 
which a user manipulates the network, whether it is to clear the road ahead, track 
vehicles, disable information flow, load malware, or inflict physical harm.  When a node 
can be isolated as the source of bad information or other problems in the network, its 
certificates should be revoked for the safety and betterment of the rest. 
3.3.2 Private Key/Certificate Compromise 
 Private key compromise is when the owner of the private key suspects that 
someone else is also in possession of that private key.  Whoever possesses the private key 
can request certificates and sign messages as if they were the actual entity with whom the 
private key is associated.  Whenever a private key is compromised, all certificates 
associated with that private must be revoked and no new certificates may be issued for 
that private key.  Depending on the actual implementation of VANET security, people 
with specific knowledge may be able to access and possibly corrupt or copy material in 
the OBU.  Physical security of vehicles equipped with VANET technology cannot be 
maintained to always prevent physical access by malicious entities.  Although trusted 
computing platforms are targeted for use in VANET applications, it is not unreasonable 
to assume there will be vulnerabilities in the implementations [41]. 
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3.3.3 Equipment Malfunctions 
 This category includes hardware failures of sensors, radio equipment, trusted 
platforms, location determination equipment (such as the global positioning satellite 
device), etc. that cause erroneous messaged to be sent out into the VANET.  Software 
errors may also contribute to this rate.  Electronic devices are imperfect, so malfunctions 
are possible, causing erroneous or faulty messages to be sent from an otherwise innocent 
source.  This rate is expected to be low, but no actual numbers have been determined yet.  
Until the device can be repaired, the certificates associated with it should be revoked so 
that other nodes in the network discard the misinformation. 
3.3.4 Change of Ownership 
 While specific reasons for revocation are not addressed in the IEEE 1609 
standards, it is likely that a change in vehicle ownership will trigger the issuance of new 
certificates; thus, the previous certificates must be invalidated prior to their normal 
expiration.  Change of ownership events represent the different causes for possession of 
the vehicle to change, which may or may not prompt a change in certificates and 
pseudonyms.  The decision as to whether or not this category is included in the 
revocation process has not been discussed in previous literature.  When a car changes 
ownership, both the seller and the purchaser may be concerned that there could be an 
error in determining responsibility in the event one of the car's certificates is associated 
with a malicious event.  Thus, valid certificates remaining in the OBU should be revoked 
when a change in ownership occurs to ensure that unused certificates do not fall into the 
wrong hands.  Simple deletion of the keys stored in the OBU may not be sufficient 
assurance that the certificates will not be used elsewhere.  To ensure the certificates 
cannot be considered valid by any entity, they must all be revoked.  Several events where 
vehicles change hands include: rentals, theft, sales, leases, and accidents.  Because of 
their short duration, rentals are not considered a change in ownership.   
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Total vehicles 243 100% 
Malfunctions, malicious activity, and compromise 12.2 5% 
Thefts 1.2 0.5% 
Sales, New 13.5 5.6% 
Sales, Used 44.1 18.1% 
Leases 3.4 1.4% 
Accidents 1.8 0.7% 
Total Revocations 76.2 31.3% 
 
 
3.4 CRL Size 
 The size of the CRL depends on the number of vehicles, size of the CA region, 
frequency of CRL issuance, the rate at which certificates are revoked, the number of 
pseudonyms each vehicle possesses, and the pseudonym lifetime.  In the following 
section, we try to determine the number of revocations for the entire United States as a 
starting point for calculating CRL file sizes. 
 Portions of the change of ownership data are available for the United States for 
different years.  We used data from 2005, since it is the most recent year for which data is 
available for all of the categories examined.  According to [42], published annually by the 
FBI, about 1.2 million car thefts occurred in the US in 2005.  The National 
Transportation Statistics, 2007 [43] shows new and used car sales and leases to be about 
61 million in 2005.  According to [43], the number of accidents in 2005 that caused 
injury was 1.8 million.  The total number of registered vehicles in the United States in 
2005 was reported as 243 million by [44]. 
 The number of ownership changes is 26.3% of the total number of vehicles 
operating in the United States.  Adding in 5% for revocations due to malfunctions, 
malicious activity, and compromise results in a 31.3% annual revocation rate.  While data 
is not available for malicious activity, compromises, or malfunctions, estimates of 5% 
and 10% have been used in other papers for revocation rates [28, 35, 36, 38].  Table 3 
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shows the annual revocation triggers for the entire United States. 
 The expected number of pseudonyms at the time of revocation is one half of the 
vehicle's issued pseudonyms.  The annual number of revocations can be found using (2) 
to find the number of valid pseudonyms remaining per OBU, POBU, with the number of 
days, d, set to 365/2, and lifetime, LT, set to 365.  This value is then used in (3) to find 
the total number of annual revocations.  If every vehicle in the United States was 
provisioned with 43,800 pseudonyms for an average of two hours of driving per day, it is 
expected that at the rates specified in Table 3 about 1.37x10
12
 pseudonyms would require 
revocation over the year. 
R Total number of certificate revocations 
N Total vehicles in the system = 243 million 
OCP Ownership changes using pseudonyms = 20.8% 
MMC Revocations due to maliciousness, malfunctions, and compromises = 5% 
OC1 Ownership changes with one certificate = 5.6% 
POBU Valid pseudonyms in the OBU at revocation time 
 
 R = N · (OCP + MMC) · POBU + N · OC1 (3) 
 Figure 6 shows the number of revocations per hour when pseudonyms are 
requested for two hours of driving per day, with different pseudonym lifetimes.  These 
charts also show the dramatic reduction in the number of revocations due to using limited 











































































3.5 Certificate Authority Regions 
 Another factor that influences the size of the CRL is the number of vehicles in the 
CA region.  The CA issues all pseudonyms for a specific geographic region.  When 
vehicles move from one geographic region to another, the vehicle must acquire new 
pseudonyms for that region to protect the privacy of the "foreign" vehicle.  A hierarchy of 
CA responsibility is established so that a long-term certificate from one CA can be used 
to acquire pseudonyms from a different CA, as long as the pseudonym-issuing CA trusts 
the long-term certificate-issuing CA, i.e., has their public key.  New pseudonyms should 
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be acquired rather than using out-of-region pseudonyms to preserve privacy.  If an out-of-
region pseudonym is used, it will be easily recognizable as such [25]. 
 There is a trade-off between the size of the CA region and size of the CRL, as 
well as the management complexity of the entire PKI system for VANETs.  The least 
complicated region to manage would be a single large area, such as the entire United 
States, with a single CA responsible for every certificate and pseudonym.  This would 
also result in the largest CRL since every revocation would appear on the CRL.  This 
relationship is shown in (4) and (5). 
 CRL Size ∝ Size of Region (4) 
 Management Complexity ∝ 1/Size of Region (5) 
 Bellur in [28] gives some analysis on region size and provides some techniques 
for managing transitions from one region to another, including maintaining multiple sets 
of pseudonyms.  Thus, a vehicle would have a set of pseudonyms for their "home" region 
plus additional sets of pseudonyms for regions adjacent to their "home" region.  He also 
explains the proportionality between the CRL size and the size of the region in more 
detail. 
 Another possibility for adjusting the size of the CRL with large regions is to use 
the partitioned CRL method of distribution, along with the "series" field of the 
WAVECRL.  The partitioned CRL would be used to distribute regional CRLs, designated 
by the series field.  Thus, when a vehicle plans a destination in a different region, the 
vehicle can request the CRL for that region.  Another method involves distributing a 
region's CRL to adjacent regions and vehicles can decide to store or ignore CRL pieces 
based on the series.  This would require an additional 4 bytes, or less if a hash value or 
cardinal direction bit is used, of overhead per piece in the header to designate the series 
of the CRL piece. 
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3.6 The WAVE CRL 
 The CRL structure defined in [9] has four main parts: version, signer, 
unsigned_CRL, and signature.  These fields verify the authenticity and integrity of the 
CRL by describing the version and which CA created it, and also provide the wanted 
information: revoked certificates.  The CRL version, as specified in the current release of 
[9], is always 1.  The signer field is information about the CA issuing and signing the 
CRL.  The unsigned_CRL, which contains the useful information, is composed of 
additional fields: type, crl_series, ca_id, crl_serial, start_period, issue_date, next_crl, and 
entries.  The series, start period, issue date, and next CRL all help identify the CRL so 
that the user knows what list they have received as well as when the next update can be 
expected.  As discussed in sections 3.1.4 and 3.5, the series field can be used to designate 
a geographical or logical partition of the CRL.  Entries can contain either the ID of a 
revoked certificate only, or both the ID and the expiry date.  Including the certificate 
expiry date helps to reduce the number of stored revocations over time.  Each 
WAVECRL may contain up to a maximum of 2
64
–1 entries.  Finally, the CA issuing the 
CRL signs the unsigned_crl portion and appends the ecdsa_signature. 
 Using the fields described above and the lengths found in Annex D.3.3 of the 
1609.2 standard for other structures, the size of a CRL was determined to be 230 bytes 
plus 14 bytes per certificate.  The certificate ID is found by generating the SHA-256 hash 
of the certificate and then taking the low-order 10 bytes of the hash output.  The expiry 
date is an additional 4 bytes, resulting in 14 bytes per revoked certificate.  This 
information is summarized in Figure 7, which is formatted according to the structures in 
Annex C of 1609.2. 
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 The actual size of a CRL can be highly variable, depending on a few factors.  
Clearly, the size of the CRL directly corresponds to the number of pseudonyms needing 
revocation, which is dependent on the revocation rate.  Based on the earlier assumption 
that a pseudonym is removed from the OBU upon selection of a new pseudonym, the 
number of pseudonyms in the OBU needing revocation will decrease over time.  
Assuming a uniform distribution for the revocation rate, one-half of the valid 
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 The CRL will be generated at a pre-determined time interval, e.g. every hour.  
Using the number of revocations from Figure 6, the WAVECRL size can be calculated 
by multiplying the number of revocations by the size of each revocation, 14 bytes.  The 
WAVECRL elements in Figure 7 add an additional 230 bytes to the final size.  The 
resulting WAVECRL sizes are shown in Figure 8 for different values of driving time and 
pseudonym lifetime [29].  For example, if enough pseudonyms were generated for an 
average of two hours of driving per day with a lifetime of one week, the hourly CRL size 
is 42.2 megabytes per hour.  Since these are the new revocations each hour, the CRL size 
will be additive over the day; thus, the total daily CRL size for previous example would 
be 1012 megabytes (24 hours times 42.2 megabytes per hour).  If delta-CRL is used to 
 
 





















































send out hourly updates with the base-CRL sent out once per day, a summation of the 
hourly CRLs would be about 12 gigabytes of data over the day, i.e., each hour’s Delta-
CRL size is the hour number times the base-CRL size, assuming uniform revocations 
throughout the day (thus the base-CRL size is equal to one hour’s Delta-CRL size).  
However, since Delta-CRL sends all changes since the base-CRL was sent, only the base-
CRL and the most recent Delta-CRL need to be stored in the OBU.  In this example, the 
base-CRL is about 42.2 megabytes, and the last Delta-CRL of the day is about 
23x42.2=971 megabytes.  Assuming only yearly consumer visits to a pseudonym update 
facility, Figure 8 compares the file sizes of CRLs. The year line represents the case where 
our proposed ―valid after‖ field is not used. All other lines (month, week, day, hour) 
assume the use of our new ―valid after‖ field.  By comparing to the CRL file sizes 
associated with the year line, significant reduction in CRL file sizes is shown when the 
proposed ―valid after‖ field is used. 
 The previous revocation numbers and CRL file size are based on the entire United 
States as a single CA region.  Dividing the United States into smaller regions will also 
divide the number of revocations and the CRL file size by the same factor.  While using 
more CA regions increases the complexity of pseudonym and CRL management due to 
vehicles crossing regional boundaries, this method does very effectively reduce the CRL 




VANET EFFECTS ON CRL DISTRIBUTION 
4.1 Introduction 
 Several factors influence the distribution of the CRL in the VANET, including the 
encoding method used and the available channel capacity.  We look at these factors now 
to see how they impact the selection of methods and the expected outcome. 
4.2 Encoding Methods 
 The CRL file may be a large file, depending on the number of vehicles in the 
region of the certificate authority, the revocation list distribution protocol, and the 
revocation rate.  CRL file sizes in excess of 1 megabyte will be common.  The CRL can 
be sent out in broadcast mode to the members of the VANET using a distribution method 
where each RSU transmits the entire CRL over and over again.  However, rather than 
sending out the entire file as a stream of packets where every packet is needed to 
reconstruct the file, coding techniques can be used to break the file into packet-sized 
pieces using encoding to generate redundant pieces.  This will accomplish two things: a 
single missing piece will not prevent an OBU from recovering the CRL, and OBUs can 
forward individual pieces even if they do not possess the entire file. 
 When no coding method is used, every piece must be downloaded.  Coding 
techniques reduce the impact of the piece problem, also referred to as the coupon 
collection problem, which exists in file sharing techniques that simply split a file into 
multiple pieces, such as BitTorrent™ [45].  To download a copy of the original file using 
BitTorrent™, the destination node must download a copy of every piece of the file from 
peers.  The piece problem occurs when there is difficulty downloading one or more 
pieces due to the lack of availability of some pieces at other peer nodes.  The missing 
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pieces prevent the destination node from completing the download.  While BitTorrent™ 
works well in a wired environment, it does not work as well in a wireless environment 
due to the limited distances over which the physical layer is able to reach, and because 
some nodes join and leave the network quickly. 
 Based on information theory principles in [46], the number of pieces that must be 
downloaded to guarantee every piece of a file is received is found as 
 𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 =  𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒 ∗ ln(
𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠  𝑖𝑛  𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒
1−% 𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒
). (6) 
The cost of not coding is shown in Table 4.  This table shows the number of pieces 
required for download of a 2000-piece file at varying percentage levels of guarantee that 
all 2000 pieces of the file are received.  This means that if pieces are broadcast using a 
random selection process and that every piece must be received to reassemble the file, on 
average almost 20,000 broadcasts must be done to have a 90% guarantee that all 2000 
pieces were selected for broadcast. 
 Some VANET file-sharing models discuss the use of Network Coding or Erasure 
Coding as a means of making data dissemination throughout a network more efficient 
and timely [47-51].    Network coding and Erasure coding techniques mitigate the piece 
problem by coding the file in a manner such that the file can be reconstructed from a sub-
set of the pieces generated.  These coding techniques are very effective in network 
conditions like those in a VANET, where nodes join and leave frequently, and nodes are 
in contact for short periods of time. 
 
Table 4.  Required pieces to download for a 2000-piece file 
with no coding methods used. 
% guarantee 









 Two parameters that are necessary to describe the coding techniques are coding 
rate and coding overhead.  The coding rate describes the percentage of additional pieces 
encoded.  The coding overhead describes the percentage of additional pieces needed to 
reconstruct the file.  Thus, a 200% coding rate means that twice the number of pieces are 
generated from a file.  A coding overhead of 5% means that 105% of the number of file 
pieces are necessary to reconstruct the file.  For example, if a file can be broken into 2000 
pieces, a 200% coding rate generates 4000 pieces.  A coding overhead of 5% means that 
2100 pieces (of the 4000) must be received to reconstruct the file [52]. 
 Two predominant coding techniques are discussed by other researchers [47-49, 
52-57], network coding, and a type of erasure coding called raptor coding.  The primary 
difference between the two techniques according to Fujimura, et al. in [49] is where the 
coding is accomplished.  Erasure coding entails all encoding done by a single source.  
Original source-encoded pieces are shared in order to re-create the original file.  When 
using erasure coding, a node will simply send out the same piece it received without 
making any changes.  Network coding entails coding at each node, combining the file 
pieces possessed at that node into new pieces that contain aggregated data combined from 
existing pieces.  These new pieces are shared with other nodes.  When a node receives a 
network coded piece, it is checked for linear independence with currently possessed 
pieces, requiring greater processing capability at every OBU.  Erasure coding has less 
overhead, both in packet overhead to carry the coding information, and in processing 
overhead to reconstruct the file.  Raptor coding is a more specific type of erasure coding 
that is better suited for file distribution in VANETs.  Raptor codes are rateless erasure 
codes capable of producing a large number of redundant file pieces [52, 58]. 
4.2.1 Erasure Coding 
 Using erasure coding, CRL pieces are all generated by the CA.  Each piece may 
be signed individually by the CA, which adds 110 bytes of overhead per piece, as shown 
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in Table 2.  Only 110 bytes of overhead is required since only the CA certificate ID needs 
to be sent with the pieces since every node must possess the CA certificate.  This 
increases the security of sending pieces since each piece is signed by the CA.  Piece 
generation by the CA also makes the most efficient use of processing time.  This means 
that OBUs only have to check the signature of each piece.  No processing is necessary to 
pass the piece on to a neighbor.  Since the content of the piece is not confidential, there is 
no need to encrypt pieces, so time is spent only on signature verification.  Decoding the 
pieces is O(𝑘 log  
1
𝜀
 ), where k is the number of pieces and ε is the coding overhead [52]. 
4.2.2 Network Coding 
 Network coding, as introduced by Ahlswede et al. in [53], makes very efficient 
use of the available channel capacity by encoding data in such a way that all existing 
pieces are used to generate new pieces to forward.  This is especially applicable to 
multicast situations, such as the distribution of files from one source to many nodes.  The 
result of this is that "new" pieces are generated by each node by forming random linear 
combinations of existing data pieces and forwarding them to other nodes.  The cost of 
processing new pieces is O(n) where n is the number of pieces.  According to [57], the 
encoding may take more time than the transmission of the piece.  Decoding can be a 
lengthy process, as explained by Kötter and Kschischang in [59], on the order of O(n
2
) 
where n is a measure of the vector dimensions used to encode the data based on the 
amount of data transmitted.  Another source, [60], states that decoding is O(n
3
).  Thus, as 
the size of the CRL increases, the complexity of decoding the file increases rapidly.  The 
encoding vector also grows as the file size increases, by about one byte per piece sent 
[57].  Thus, for a file consisting of 1000 1-kilobyte pieces, an encoding vector overhead 
of 1000 bytes per piece sent is needed, doubling the size of the packet. 
 Although network coding presents great benefits for the use of channel capacity, 
the process of using network coding to distribute CRLs in a VANET is very challenging 
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for two reasons: possible injection of false pieces, and a non-zero error rate on the 
channel.  Both situations lead to severely corrupted CRL files.  Since every node can 
generate new pieces that are supposed to be linear combinations of other pieces, false 
pieces could be injected by either a malicious or malfunctioning node.  The false pieces 
would be difficult to detect until they were decoded.  This problem is compounded by the 
fact that receiving nodes will use these corrupted pieces to combine with their existing 
pieces, passing along more corrupted pieces.  Noise on the channel could also corrupt 
broadcast pieces, although the layers below the application where the pieces are used 
should be able to detect corrupted packets.  Noise affects all packets, but if a corrupted 
piece is accepted in a network coding scenario, not only is that piece corrupted, but also 
all pieces that use the corrupted piece to linearly combine to form new pieces. 
 Because of the high computation cost and the security issues, using network 
coding is not as well suited as erasure coding for distributing CRLs in VANETs. 
4.2.3 Network Coding Generation Concept 
 One feature of network coding that may prove useful in other methods is the 
concept of generations.  Generations are parts of the total file that are encoded separately, 
that is, each generation must be downloaded to re-create the entire file.  This concept can 
be extended such that the CRL can be broken into smaller, stand-alone parts of the entire 
CRL.  This would allow large CRLs, which are basically just a listing of certificate IDs, 
to be broken into smaller parts and used independently until the rest of the parts can be 
 
 
Figure 9.  Example of network coding generations. 
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downloaded; thus, a vehicle could access portions of the CRL faster than waiting for the 
entire CRL.  The concept of generations is shown in Figure 9 [61]. 
4.3 Available Channel Capacity 
 In [62], Eichler evaluates DSRC for a single broadcaster to determine how many 
packets can  be sent during a single control channel interval.  We present updated 
information here based on parameters from IEEE 1609.4 [16] and IEEE 802.11p [17] for 
the service channel interval. 
 Given that the CCH and SCH interval is 50 milliseconds minus the guard interval 
of 4 milliseconds, each interval is only 46 milliseconds in duration for transmission of 
data.  The number of packets that can be sent during a single CCH or SCH interval can be 
determined by the interval time divided by the amount of time it takes to send a single 
packet over the channel.  The data rate for the broadcast channel is 3 million bits per 
second. 
 A beacon packet is 100 bytes of payload plus 72 bytes of additional headers, so it 
takes 459 microseconds to transmit a single beacon packet.  Using the values in Table 1 
for "Best Effort" access class, we determine that on average 75 beacons can be 
transmitted during the CCH interval after adding an additional 152 microseconds per 
beacon for the AIFS and the average contention window timers. 
 The length of a data packet determines the number of packets that can be 
transmitted during the SCH interval.  The number of packets that can be transmitted 
during a single SCH is shown in Figure 10 for several different packet lengths.  The 
throughput drops at certain packet sizes due to having to receive a complete packet to be 
counted toward the throughput, so all packet numbers are rounded down to integer 
values. 
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 This becomes an upper limit for the number of packets that can be transmitted 
during a single interval.  Collisions will reduce the number of packets successfully 
received.  Based on the best case of the upper limit of packets received, an estimate of the 
download time for a 1 megabyte CRL file is presented in Figure 11. 
  
 































Figure 10.  Number of packets transmitted and throughput as a function of packet length 





























































CRL DISTRIBUTION METHODS 
5.1 Introduction 
 Distribution of the CRL in a VANET is a multi-step process.  Figure 12 is used to 
illustrate the process.  The first step is the certificate authority (CA) generating a list of 
OBU certificates that require revocation (1).  Once the CRL is formatted and 
cryptographically signed by the CA according to the specification in [9], encoding 
methods are used to split the CRL file into multiple pieces (2).  The CA also signs each 
piece to protect the pieces from being modified.  The next step is for the CA to distribute 
the CRL pieces to the RSUs (3).  The RSUs receive all of the CRL file pieces from the 
CA and determine the authenticity of the pieces by verifying the signature on each piece.  
After the pieces have been verified, they can be broadcast to the OBUs within radio range 
of the RSU.  V2V communications are used to pass the file to those vehicles not within 
range of the RSU.  The OBUs will gather pieces of the CRL until enough of the file 
pieces are received to reassemble the file, at which time the CA signature is used to 
verify the file authenticity [63]. 
 
 Figure 12.  CRL distribution in a VANET. 
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 Taking advantage of the coding techniques discussed in Chapter 4.2, only a 
certain number of pieces must be stored to reconstruct the file, rather than needing every 
piece of the file when coding techniques are not used.  Another benefit of using raptor 
codes is that the CA can pre-code the entire CRL into pieces before distributing the file to 
the RSUs.  This uses the higher processing capacity of the CA to generate the pieces. 
5.2 Current Methods of CRL Distribution (Related Work) 
 We have studied methods of certificate revocation and file distribution in detail 
through literature surveys and discussions with the authors of those papers.  Some 
research in the area of distributing CRLs in VANETs has been done previously by other 
research groups.  Two groups have proposed solutions to the CRL distribution problem.  
The first group developed solutions that depend on extensive infrastructure for their 
methods to work.  The second group looked at using both RSUs and other vehicles to 
distribute the CRL. 
5.2.1 RSU-only (EPFL) 
 A group from Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne (EPFL) in Switzerland, 
led by Dr. Jean-Pierre Hubaux, accomplished a great deal of work on VANET security, 
such as certificate revocation techniques and privacy-protection techniques [13, 23, 25, 
32, 38, 64-66].  While they discussed concepts for CRL distribution, their approaches 
have not considered high vehicle traffic densities, the large-scale scope of the VANET, or 
alternative reasons for revocation; thus, they looked at a simplified model for evaluating 
their methods.  They have also not considered V2V communications in their methods, 
until recently in [47]. 
 EPFL's main contribution to the CRL solution is their proposed three-part scheme 
consisting of two methods that require RSUs and a third method used outside of RSU 
range for ignoring messages from suspected misbehaving nodes, first introduced in [38].  
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These methods include deleting certificates directly from the vehicle hardware using 
messages sent from RSUs, using Bloom filters to generate compressed revocation lists, 
and vehicles cooperatively determining possible malicious or malfunctioning nodes [23, 
25, 32, 64-66].  These three methods are employed together to cover several situations for 
revoking certificates or ignoring misbehaving nodes.  This protocol set covers situations 
where the nodes will not always be guaranteed access to the CA; therefore, the off-line 
method is proposed to cover those times when the CA is not reachable, or more 
accurately, when the CA is not able to reach the nodes.  Assumptions in this protocol are 
that the vehicles already have several hardware components installed, including a trusted 
component for securely storing and processing cryptographic material, and that RSUs are 
readily available. 
5.2.1.1 Revocation of the Trusted Component 
 The first on-line revocation method described by the group from EPFL in [32] is 
Revocation of the Trusted Component (RTC).  The trusted component is a part of the 
OBU that stores the valid certificates for a vehicle, signs messages, and performs 
encryption and decryption functions.  RTC is a series of messages sent from the CA 
through an RSU to the misbehaving vehicle’s trusted component.  These messages serve 
to effectively delete all valid certificates from the vehicle, preventing the OBU from 
signing messages.  This method assumes the presence of infrastructure to send the 
messages to the trusted component.  It also assumes that the trusted component will 
follow the directions to delete the certificates; however, this is not necessarily a valid 
assumption, since the trusted component may have been compromised.  Several methods 
for compromising trusted components are discussed in [41].  To ensure that messages 
from this OBU are not considered valid once the certificates have been revoked, 
revocation information must also be distributed via CRLs. 
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5.2.1.2 Revocation Using Compressed CRL 
 The second on-line revocation method discussed in [32] is Revocation using 
Compressed Certificate Revocation Lists (RC2RL).  This method sends out certificate 
revocation lists that are compressed using Bloom filters to make the lists smaller.  This 
method reduces the size of the CRL by using about half the number of bytes to specify 
the certificate ID for revocation.  This shortens the already hashed value so that the 
number of false positives increases. 
 RTC prevents the misbehaving node from sending out signed messages by 
directly removing the certificates from the trusted component, while RC2RL notifies 
other nodes in the VANET that the certificates have been revoked.  It is necessary to 
notify nodes in the event that RTC failed to delete the certificates in the misbehaving 
trusted component.  These methods are both dependent on vehicles being able to 
communicate with the CA through RSUs. 
5.2.1.3 Local Eviction of Attackers by Voting Evaluators 
 The off-line method from EPFL is called Local Eviction of Attackers by Voting 
Evaluators (LEAVE).  This is more of a warning method rather than an actual revocation 
method.  The Misbehavior Detecting System (MDS) is a part of the LEAVE protocol.  
MDS functions as a type of intrusion detection system to recognize patterns of 
misbehavior using on-board sensors to verify information sent by nodes.  Once MDS 
identifies a misbehaving vehicle, LEAVE warns other vehicles in close proximity about 
the misbehaving node.  This results in a temporary suspension of accepting messages 
from the accused misbehaving node.  Once the vehicles are able to contact a CA, the CA 
may initiate actual revocation of the misbehaving node’s certificates using RTC and 
RC2RL. 
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5.2.2 V2V Methods 
 Combining V2I with V2V communication enables a new set of CRL distribution 
methods to be developed.  Figure 13 illustrates the concept of integrated V2I and V2V 
communication.  The exchange begins with a vehicle entering the broadcast range of the 
RSU (1).  As the vehicle travels past the RSU (2) it receives and stores several CRL 
pieces.  Once the vehicle drives beyond radio range of the RSU it will eventually 
encounter another vehicle (3).  Each vehicle may have some CRL pieces.  As the vehicles 
come into radio range of each other (4) they broadcast pieces of the CRL.  Any new 
 
Figure 13.  V2I and V2V integration in VANET. 
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pieces are stored by the receiver (5).  Duplicate pieces received by the OBU are 
discarded. 
5.2.2.1 EPFL V2V CRL Distribution 
 The one paper by EPFL that did discuss using V2V communications is a paper 
dealing specifically with distribution methods of CRLs [47].  Their assumptions were that 
there was not a dense infrastructure, RSU-to-RSU communication was not required, and 
CRLs were regionally focused.  Their scheme has three basic elements: small CRLs due 
to only sending information about a certain region; breaking the CRL into small pieces; 
and using low-rate broadcast of CRL pieces from RSUs.  Fountain codes and Erasure 
codes are mentioned as the method for encoding the CRL into small pieces. 
5.2.2.2 Epidemic CRL Update Distribution 
 Laberteaux, Haas, and Hu proposed an epidemic distribution method in [50] that 
is most closely related to this proposal, yet they do not go into the implementation details 
other than stating that CRL updates will be distributed using V2V communications.  They 
discuss the difficulty of picking the proper level of detail and accuracy for simulations to 
study the problem.  A simple "infection" model was used in their study for proof of 
concept.  Vehicles are considered to receive the CRL update whenever they are within 
100 meters of another vehicle for 2 seconds, so no form of radio propagation or network 
congestion was involved.  The simulation study was massive in size, accounting for 
260,000 vehicles over approximately 354km x 263km of area surrounding Zurich, 
Switzerland [67, 68].  Only CRL updates are distributed in this model, not the entire 
CRL.  The study did show that by using V2V communications with a single RSU, the 
CRL update was distributed to over 99% of the vehicles at the end of the 9000 second 
simulation.  This compares to a completion rate of about 92% using 325 RSUs with no 
V2V communication and only a 0.1 second contact requirement. 
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 This group also proposed a method of linking certificates through the use of a 
secret key [24].  This method distributes a single secret key that is used by the OBU to 
generate hashes of every pseudonym the revoked vehicle owns.  While this does greatly 
reduce the size of the CRL, it does associate every pseudonym to the owner.  This 
violates the premise of maintaining privacy in the VANET.  By associating every 
pseudonym, the owner's previous locations can be traced by examining stored 
communications.  Just because the certificates are revoked does not mean that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy should be waived.  This is especially true in the case of 
an equipment malfunction.  Just because a vehicle has equipment problems, the owner of 
that vehicle should not forfeit their privacy.  Distributing the Bloom filter instead of the 
secret keys would alleviate the problem of revealing all of the pseudonyms and also 
relieve the OBU of having to conduct multiple hashes to generate the Bloom filter. 
5.2.2.3 Car Torrent 
 A group from the University of California, Los Angeles, led by Dr. Mario Gerla, 
conducted research involving vehicular peer-to-peer networking.  Their methods were 
designed for general-purpose file sharing rather than CRL distribution.  For the purposes 
of general file sharing in VANETs, Lee, Seung-Hoon, et al. advocate Car Torrent, a peer-
to-peer file-swarming protocol similar to BitTorrent™ in which users not in contact with 
an RSU can still download parts of files from their peers [69].  They use a file-swarming 
protocol based upon SPAWN, which is previous work by one of the co-authors [70].  Car 
Torrent uses k-hop limited-scope broadcasting, known as gossiping, and a piece selection 
strategy to optimally download files from peers.  As the vehicle density increases, the 
overhead due to the gossiping and the routing algorithms quickly increases the delay of 
file transfers.  Also, since there is no coding involved in this method, every piece of the 
file must be downloaded to recover the original file. 
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5.2.2.4 Code Torrent 
 Because of the high delays associated with Car Torrent, another method, called 
Code Torrent, was developed by Dr. Gerla's research group.  Unlike the multiple hops 
used by Car Torrent, Code Torrent approaches data dissemination from a single-hop 
perspective by only allowing peers to share with their immediate neighbors, thereby 
eliminating the need for a routing mechanism [55].  In the Code Torrent scheme, 
participating nodes broadcast information to their immediate neighbors regarding the files 
they have and can share.  All nodes listen promiscuously to the broadcasts sent by their 
neighbors.  If a node receives information that one of its neighbors has a file that is of 
particular interest to it, then it will broadcast a request for that file to all of its neighbors.  
Any neighbor node that receives the request and that has all or part of the requested file 
to share then responds with a coded frame containing parts of the requested file.  The 
interested node will continue to request coded frames from its neighbors until it has 
enough linearly independent pieces to recover the entire file.  The authors refer to the 
percentage of nodes interested in downloading the file as the file's popularity.  They used 
a 40% popularity in their study. 
 Code Torrent uses network coding to construct the coded frames.  Each coded 
frame contains a random selection of various parts of the requested file and the encoding 
vector that the sender used to encode it, as well as the file identification and transaction 
identification.  Dr. Gerla's group compares the performance of Code Torrent to Car 
Torrent in [55].  Their results show that as the number of nodes increases, like in a 
metropolitan area, Car Torrent performance gradually degrades because of the gossip 
messages and the underlying routing protocol.  On the other hand, Code Torrent delay to 
obtain files decreases as mobility and congestion increase.  However, the number of 
vehicles classified as interested in downloading the file in the Code Torrent study was 
only a maximum of 80 vehicles in a 5.76 square kilometer area, which is roughly 14 
vehicles per square kilometer.  Code Torrent performs better in congestion situations than 
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Car Torrent does, but still suffers from all nodes attempting to access the medium.  This 
results in nodes waiting until the medium is idle for several slot times before 
broadcasting.  The other condition that occurs is the hidden terminal problem, which 
results in increased transmission collisions.  We anticipate that there is a vehicle density 




NEW METHODS OF DISTRIBUTION 
 While the original intent of Code Torrent was for sharing files that only a subset 
of the network was interested in downloading, the method may also work very well for 
files such as the CRL that every node in the VANET wants to download.  The CRL will 
have a popularity of 100% since every node will want the most recent CRL to protect 
them from malicious users and malfunctioning equipment, as well as to increase the 
overall security and safety of the VANET.  While Code Torrent makes improvements 
over other previous methods of V2V file sharing by using broadcast mode to avoid 
routing difficulties and network coding to mitigate the piece problem, it still suffers under 
heavy load.  This is due to the method having every OBU broadcast requests and relevant 
coded frames.  Normal traffic on a bi-directional multi-lane highway can exceed 100 
vehicles in a single 300-meter DSRC radio range, which is roughly 300 vehicles per 
square kilometer [71].  This normal traffic condition is much greater than the 14 vehicles 
per square kilometer simulated in the Code Torrent study.  To reduce the contention for 
the wireless channel, we developed two methods to attempt to reduce the number of 
OBUs contending for the channel, Most Pieces Broadcast and Generation per Channel.  
Reducing the number of OBUs contending for the channel will increase the number of 
CRL pieces successfully received by the OBUs in the VANET [56].  This research 
combines aspects of the approaches from EPFL, Laberteaux, Haas and Hu, and UCLA to 
develop a better solution for distributing CRLs in a VANET environment. 
6.1 Most Pieces Broadcast 
 The best situation for reducing contention for the wireless medium is to limit the 
number of broadcasting nodes to a single node.  At this point there is no contention for 
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the channel, so the throughput will be the highest possible within the constraints of the 
channel capacity.  The Most Pieces Broadcast (MPB) method, introduced in [56], creates 
a situation where only the node with the most number of CRL file pieces is selected to 
broadcast within a given radio broadcast range.  The hidden terminal problem still exists 
for those OBUs that are within radio range of more than one selected node, so collisions 
still occur, but contention for the channel is reduced significantly.  MPB will work in 
both V2I and V2V conditions with or without the presence of RSUs.  Using MPB, RSUs 
will be selected as the node with the most pieces, since the RSU has every piece of the 
CRL file, resulting in an "RSU-only" broadcast scenario in the vicinity of the RSU.  The 
RSUs are still needed to disseminate the CRL initially before V2V distribution can be 
used so that some vehicles have pieces to share. 
 MPB takes advantage of the CCH interval in DSRC to accomplish the process of 
selecting the node with the most CRL pieces.  During the CCH interval, nodes exchange 
beacon packets.  MPB adds information to the beacon packet to identify the CRL and the 
number of pieces that the node possesses.  Each CRL is uniquely identified by the pair of 
fields containing the CA identifier and the CRL serial.  Methods for reducing the number 
of bytes required for the CA identifier and CRL serial, such as hashing or using only the 
lower two bytes of each field, could be used to reduce the number of bytes added to the 
beacons.  The number of pieces can be represented with 2 bytes, allowing up to 65,535 
pieces to be accounted for.  This requires a total of 6 bytes added to the beacon to 
advertise the number of CRL pieces possessed by each node for a specific CRL. 
 This piece-count information is used by receiving OBUs to increment a counter 
that contains the number of OBUs that possess more pieces than the OBU receiving the 
beacon.  OBUs reset the counter that keeps track of other nodes that have more pieces to 
zero at the beginning of every CCH interval.  RSUs also send out a beacon that includes 
the piece-count.  If an RSU is within radio range of the OBU, the RSU will always 
increment the OBU counter since the RSU will always have the complete CRL.  If the 
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OBU counter is zero, that means the OBU has the most number of pieces within its 
listening range, so it will become the broadcaster during the following SCH interval.  
During the SCH interval, only OBUs that have been "selected" will broadcast CRL 
pieces.  If an OBU counter is greater than zero, this means that other OBUs within its 
radio range have more CRL pieces, so it will remain silent and listen for broadcast pieces 
during the SCH interval.  Listening OBUs will store any new pieces they receive during 
the SCH interval and update their piece-count to send out with their next beacon on the 
following CCH interval. 
 If no pieces are received for a time period equal to the wait time calculated in (7), 
the silent OBU will begin to broadcast.  This occurs when an OBU that incremented the 
waiting OBU's counter is listening to another OBU in its range. 
cwMin The cwMin value from Table 1, measured in slots 
AIFS The AIFS value from Table 1, measured in slots 
TSlot Slot time, 16 microseconds 
CtrCCH Counter value from the CCH Interval of nodes with more CRL pieces 
TPacket Time to transmit the packet at the given data rate 
Len Length of packet in bytes 
Data Rate Data Rate of transmitter in bits per second 
 
 𝑊𝑎𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 2 ×  𝑐𝑤𝑀𝑖𝑛 + 𝐴𝐼𝐹𝑆 × 𝑇𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑡 × 𝐶𝑡𝑟𝐶𝐶𝐻 + 𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡  (7) 
 𝑇𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 =
(𝐿𝑒𝑛𝐻𝑑𝑟 +𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑒 +𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 )×8
𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
 (8) 
 Based on using the "Best Effort" access class, the wait time is 576 microseconds 
per counter value, plus 2,741.3 microseconds for TPacket, based on a 22-byte WSMP 
header, a 1000-byte piece size, and 6 bytes of CRL piece-tracker information.  This 
results in a 3,317.3 microsecond wait time for an OBU that has a counter value of one. 
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Figure 14.  Example of most pieces broadcast. 
 MPB is illustrated with the help of Figure 14.  For this example, ACI 0, best 
effort, is used to calculate the CWmin and AIFS values from the previous paragraph as 
576 microseconds.  The numbers inside the diamonds designate the node number and the 
number of CRL file pieces possessed by that node.  Node 1 receives beacons from nodes 
3, 5, 6 and 7 during the CCH interval, all of which have more CRL pieces than node 1; 
therefore, node 1's counter is incremented to 4.  Node 6 receives a beacon from node 7, 
so node 6 will not broadcast at the beginning of the SCH interval.  Node 5 receives a 
beacon from node 6, so it will not broadcast at the beginning of the SCH interval.  During 
the SCH interval, node 6 will receive pieces from node 7 so node 6 will remain silent for 
the duration of the SCH interval.  Node 5 will not receive any pieces since node 6, as well 
as nodes 1 and 3, is silent.  Therefore, node 5 will wait 576 microseconds plus the time 
required to transmit a packet and then begin to broadcast pieces.  Nodes 6 and 1 have the 
opportunity to receive pieces from both node 7 and node 5 at this point, although the 




The basic MPB algorithm for CRL distribution is as follows: 
1. broadcast a beacon during the CCH interval with the CRL file description and 
number of pieces possessed; 
2. keep a count of other nodes that possess more pieces than self (if an RSU is present 
it will always be the node with the most pieces); 
3. wait for a fraction of the SCH interval equal to 576 microseconds times the count of 
nodes with more pieces plus the time required to transmit a packet; 
4. if no pieces are received, then broadcast pieces for remainder of SCH interval, or 
   else remain silent for remainder of SCH interval; //node is receiving pieces 
5. return to 1 
6.2 Generation per Channel 
 To allow for more nodes to participate by broadcasting their pieces, while still 
reducing the overall number of nodes contending for the medium, we developed a 
method that takes advantage of the multiple DSRC service channels.  Generation per 
Channel uses multiple service channels to distribute CRL pieces in a fashion similar to 
network coding generations, where the CRL is split into multiple independent parts.  
Additional service channels are used to accomplish sending out these independent 
generations on different service channels.  Two, four, and six service channels were used 
in this research.  Announcements during the CCH interval inform nodes about which 
generations are available on which SCHs.  This method has the benefits of pure Code 
Torrent, but the number of nodes contending for the medium is divided by the number of 
SCHs used.  GPC could also use the MPB method on multiple SCHs, but this was not 
analyzed in this research.  This would require each node to determine which service 
channel they will use in the following SCH interval and include that information in the 
beacon.  Only the counter for the SCH the OBU will use in the following SCH interval 
would be incremented in this case. 
 An added benefit of this method is that the multiple CRL parts can be used 
independently, allowing for the use of a partial CRL once a generation is fully recovered 
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on a single SCH.  A drawback of this method is that nodes must spend some time on 
multiple SCH to receive the entire CRL. 
 Two variations of GPC were evaluated.  The first method has each OBU 
randomly select a different service channel each SCH interval.  This means that each 
OBU downloads CRL generation pieces from every channel with equal probability, 
resulting in download completion for each generation at approximately the same time, on 
average.  The second method has each OBU stay on a particular service channel each 
SCH interval until the entire CRL generation is downloaded.  This results in staggered 
CRL generation downloads, but the overall download time is expected to be similar to the 
random channel selection method.  The "stay on a channel" method has the advantage of 
being able to use a partial CRL if the CRL is encoded to allow a generation to be used 
independently of other generations.  In both cases, the CCH interval and SCH interval are 
still alternately used as in MPB.  The basic GPC algorithm for CRL distribution is as 
follows: 
1. the CRL is split into two to six generations (each generation is a different part of the 
file); 
2. service announcements are broadcast on the CCH to make nodes aware of which 
generation is on which channel; 
3. each generation is distributed on a different SCH; 
4. nodes go to different SCHs to get the parts of the file (could use either Code Torrent 
or MPB) 
6.3 CRL Distribution Flow Chart 
 The flow chart in Figure 15 shows the steps needed for the methods introduced in 
this chapter.  These steps were all examined closely during the model verification phase 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 We compared the CRL distribution methods developed in Chapter 6, Most Pieces 
Broadcast and Generation per Channel, to the existing CRL distribution methods, RSU-
only and Code Torrent.  We created simulation models using the ns-3 network simulator 
[72].  The existing methods represent the extreme cases of having no OBUs broadcast in 
the RSU-only method and every OBU broadcast in the Code Torrent method.  The 
primary comparison criterion was the number of OBUs that successfully downloaded the 
CRL.  Other evaluation criteria used were the measure the number of packets transmitted 
and received during the distribution process. 
7.2 ns-3  
 We chose to use the ns-3 network simulator [72] for this research.  ns-3 is an 
open-source network simulator that was developed through NSF funding to update and 
modernize the ns-2 network simulator.  Although the product is still in development, the 
software has many features that make it desirable to use, including the active 
development of new protocols and the use of a single programming language for model 
development and simulation control. 
7.3 Assumptions 
 Several assumptions about the behavior of the nodes were made for this 
simulation.  We followed the behaviors and specifications from the IEEE 802.11p and 
1609 standards for the RSUs and OBUs.  RSUs and OBUs have the same characteristics 
in the simulation except that RSUs are stationary and OBUs are mobile.  The standard 
does require that all uses of DSRC be compatible with OBUs that have a single 
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CRL file size 1,000,000 bytes 
Piece tracking overhead 6 bytes 
Beacon size 100 bytes 
Coding overhead  5%  
CCH interval, SCH interval 50 milliseconds 
Guard interval 4 milliseconds 
Broadcast data rate 3 megabits per second 
Channel rate 3 megabits per second 
Slot time 16 microseconds 
SCH cwMin for AC 0 15 slot times, 240 microseconds 
SCH AIFSN for AC 0 3 time slots, 48 microseconds 
Delay time per node with 
more pieces 
2*(cwMin+AIFSN)*Slot time 
576 microseconds + packet transmit time 
 
transmitter/receiver unit.  This study follows that requirement in that each OBU can only 
monitor one DSRC channel at any given time, either the control channel or one of the six 
service channels.  This does not apply to RSUs, which can have multiple 
transmitter/receiver units installed, allowing them to send and receive on all service 
channels during the same SCH interval. 
7.4 Common Simulation Settings 
 Two different mobility scenarios were used in this research, a random mobility 
model and a simulated vehicle trace.  Simulation settings common to both mobility 
scenarios include the communication parameters for the infrastructure and mobile nodes 
and the CRL file properties.  The following sections explain the common simulation 
settings used for both mobility models. 
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7.4.1 Physical and MAC Layer Settings 
 The simulation uses the physical and MAC layer parameters from 802.11p.  All 
nodes alternate between the control channel and a service channel every 50 milliseconds 
in synchronization.  Table 5 summarizes the physical and MAC layer parameters used for 
the simulation.   RSUs and OBUs have the same physical and MAC layer settings. 
 The radio broadcast range was set using parameters in ns-3 so that a maximum 
reception range of about 300 meters was achieved.  Initial values were taken from 
research done by Schmidt-Eisenlohr, et al. [73, 74] for work they did in ns-2.  We ran 
several preliminary experiments to refine these values for use in ns-3. 
7.4.2 Infrastructure (RSUs) 
 RSUs were designed as stationary, wireless nodes.  Each RSU starts the 
simulation with the complete CRL, which means that every piece of the CRL is 
possessed by the RSUs.  This includes the RSUs possessing every complete generation of 
the CRL file during the Generation per Channel cases.  Also, in the GPC cases, RSUs can 
broadcast CRL file pieces on all service channels during the same SCH interval, 
effectively broadcasting a different generation on each service channel. 
7.4.3 Vehicles (OBUs) 
 OBUs were designed in the model as mobile, wireless nodes.  OBUs are given a 
mobility model dependent on the scenario being evaluated.  All OBUs start the 
simulation with the zero CRL file pieces. 
7.4.4 Replications and Pseudo-random Numbers 
 Care was taken to use pseudo-random numbers correctly in this simulation study.  
For every model, the same random number sub-stream was used for each common 
replication.  This allows us to use certain statistical analysis tools for correlated output.  
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The sub-stream value was set at run-time for each replication using the following 
command, 
NS_GLOBAL_VALUE="RngRun=$RngRunValue" ./waf --run 
"scratch/sim_model_name", 
where "$RngRunValue" is the sub-stream value used for that specific replication.  
 We ran several replications of each model, synchronizing the sub-stream values 
so that the first replication of each model used sub-stream value 1, the second replication 
of each model used sub-stream value 2, etc. 
7.4.5 CRL File Parameters 
 A one megabyte CRL was distributed using a fixed piece size per scenario.  Piece 
sizes correspond to packet payload size in the simulation.  Piece sizes of 500, 1000, and 
1500 bytes were evaluated.  For example, with 500-byte pieces, there are a total of 2000 
file pieces in the original file.  A coding rate of 200% was used, generating 4000 pieces 
from the CA.  A coding overhead of 5% was used, so each OBU must receive 2100 
unique file pieces to download the complete CRL.  CRL pieces are tracked by a piece 
number added to the packet payload.  A total of 6 bytes is added as overhead to each 
packet payload to represent the CA identifier, CRL serial, and the piece number. 
7.5 Mobility Models 
 Härri, Filali and Bonnet [75] provide a taxonomy and a detailed summary of 
existing mobility and network simulator projects.  Two different mobility models were 
used in this study.  The first is based on random, two-dimensional motion.  The second is 
based on realistic vehicular mobility traces.  While random motion of nodes does not 
provide accurate vehicle movement, it does simulate the interaction of nodes and the 
basic effectiveness of the CRL distribution methods.  The random-mobility model is used 
for verification and validation of the model and to establish parameters for the second 




Figure 16.  Bouncing box RSU and OBU start positions with 50 OBUs. 
The circles represent a 300 meter radio-range radius.  Top diagram shows scenario with 5 
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to simulate these models, we decided to limit the number of scenarios to only the most 
competitive set of parameters for each of the two methods we developed.  Once the most 
competitive levels were determined for the various experimental factors based on the 
random mobility models, we used realistic simulated vehicle traces to compare the 
effectiveness of the four different methods: RSU-only, Code Torrent, Most Pieces 
Broadcast, and Generation per Channel. 
7.5.1 Random Mobility, aka "Bouncing Box" 
 Two different random mobility scenarios were examined for the purpose of 
verification and validation of the model, one with five RSUs, each 450 meters apart with 
overlapping radio range, and one with two RSUs 1650 meters apart.  The boundaries are 
at 0 and 2250 on the x-axis, and 0 and 500 on the y-axis.  The positions of the RSUs are 
the same for every replication.  The OBUs starting position is randomly assigned inside 
the boundaries for each replication.  A representative starting location set for both the 
two-RSU case and the five-RSU is shown in Figure 16.  The ns-3 
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"RandomDirection2dMobilityModel" is used so that OBUs move in a straight line until 
they hit the boundary of the "box" at which point they pick a new heading at random and 
travel in a straight line until they hit the boundary again.  We refer to this mobility model 
as the "bouncing box."  This movement continues for the entire simulation.  Each OBU in 
the bouncing box had a constant velocity of 26 meters per second, which is roughly 60 
miles per hour.  RSUs start the simulation with every CRL piece while OBUs start the 
simulation with zero CRL pieces.  These scenarios represent different infrastructure 
density levels.  The five-RSU scenario should result in only the RSUs broadcasting when 
using MPB as explained in chapter 6.1.  The same total area was used for both scenarios.   
7.5.2 Simulated Vehicle Traces 
 The second mobility model uses more accurate vehicle movements to study the 
effectiveness of the CRL distribution methods.  Vehicle traces produced by a microscopic 
vehicular traffic simulator were used to control the OBU mobility.  We used a set of 
traces based on road maps in Switzerland [67], first used by Naumov, Baumann and 
Gross [68, 76], and later by Laberteaux, Hu and Haas in their "epidemic" paper [50].  
Each trace is 300 seconds in duration.  The traces are formatted for use with the ns-2 
network simulator, so we adapted a program to read the mobility trace files so that the 
trace files are usable with ns-3.  More information about the traces and the trace reader is 
found in Appendix A. 
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 Figure 17 shows the mobility traces of different vehicle densities in both city and 
highway scenarios.  Two different traces were used, one of a city environment, Enge-
Oberstrass, and one of a mixed highway and city environment, Hurgen-Jona.  Both of 
these traces were used in the simulation experiments to compare the four CRL 
distribution methods (RSU-Only, Code Torrent, Most Pieces Broadcast, and Generation 
per Channel).  The number of nodes and velocity information is provided in Table 6 for 
these traces. 
Table 6.  Vehicle trace parameters. 
















(medium) 520 4000 7000 8.62 32.61 19.75 
Enge-Oberstrass 
(high) 1705 4000 7000 3.3 32.62 18.09 
Hurgen-Jona 







Figure 17.  Position traces from ns-3 output for the Switzerland maps. 
The squares are the locations of RSUs used in the simulation.  Distances are in meters. 
Top trace, City, Enge-Oberstrass, 520 and 1705 OBUs. 
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7.5.3 Comparison of Mobility Models 
 There are several differences between the bouncing box model and the simulated 
vehicle trace.  In the trace, the vehicles are confined to the roads, so while there are fewer 
OBUs per total area, the OBUs are concentrated in very small areas.  This results in an 
even higher OBU density than in the bouncing box model.  Another significant difference 
is the amount of contact with neighbors.  In the bouncing box, contact was usually of 
short duration since the nodes were moving in random directions at 26 meters per second, 
but two nodes may come into contact several times throughout the simulation due to the 
confined area.  In the trace models, since vehicles are confined to the roads, contact time 
between vehicles moving in the same direction will be greater than in the bouncing box 
model; however, once contact is broken between neighbors, it is unlikely those two 
neighbors will come into contact again.  These contact patterns were not examined in this 
study. 
 In the bouncing box model, the simulation was run until every node downloaded 
the complete CRL, so completion times are used as the primary criterion.  In the trace 
mobility models, since they were of a fixed-time duration of 300 seconds, the total 
number of OBUs downloading the complete CRL is used as the primary criterion for 
evaluation for the CRL distribution methods. 
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7.6 Verification and Validation 
 Verification and validation is the process of making sure the simulation is 
working correctly, both logically and realistically.  The random mobility models were 
used to verify that the model behaved correctly and to validate the results based on other 
researcher's results. 
7.6.1 Verification 
 Model verification deals with the logic of the model -- "building the model right 
[77]."  Extensive verification of the model was done throughout writing the code for the 
simulation.  Debug statements and examination of the output were the main form of 
verification.  This process was completed for all four methods (RSU-only, Code Torrent, 
Most Pieces Broadcast, and Generation per Channel).  Each method was run for five 
replications to ensure that independent runs were being generated through the use of 
increasing the random number sub-stream for each replication.  Functionality of node 
generation, piece generation, channel switching, OBU mobility, piece downloading, and 
piece broadcast were all verified. 
7.6.2 Validation 
 Model validation deals with how realistically the model portrays the system under 
study -- "building the right model [77]."  This means that the simulation model correctly 
produces results that are similar to the results of the known system.  In our case, there is 
no existing system in place to compare the model other than the results published in [55] 
for the results of a Code Torrent simulation.  These results are shown below in Figure 18.  
Their test cases were for a file popularity of 40%, which means that only 40% of the 
nodes in their network were actively downloading the file.  We simulated our model with 
40, 60, and 80 OBUs with a velocity of 20 meters per second and 26 meters per second so 
we could compare the results.  While the mobility models were different in each study, 
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there should be at least an order of magnitude similarity between the models.  Also, the 
Code Torrent simulation in [55] did not use alternating control channels and service 
channels.  To account for this difference, we doubled the download times from the Code 
Torrent results in [55] to compensate for our 50% duty cycle. 
 The simulation developed for this study does show similar values compared to the 
results in [55] for 60 and 80 OBUs.  The error bars shown in Figure 18 are the 95% 
confidence interval for the average value of the download time, clearly showing that the 
Code Torrent values fall within the range of the confidence interval. 
7.7 Design of Experiments 
 Using the definitions in [77], a factor is a parameter or variable that may affect 
the outcome of a model.  Each factor can have several different values, or levels, at which 
it can be evaluated.  In this study, four different factors were explored to determine the 
most effective levels for the factors of MPB and GPC.  These factors are piece selection 
method, piece size, GPC channel selection method, and number of GPC channels, shown 
 
Figure 18: Comparison of simulation model to Code Torrent output. 
 
 
40 OBUs 60 OBUs 80 OBUs
CT, 20 m/s 154 154 171
SimCT, 20 m/s 127 150 175
CT, 26 m/s 145 149 165






































in Table 7 with the different levels we explored.  The four factors were evaluated at the 
different levels while holding other factors constant to generate four different 
experiments using the bouncing box mobility model with two RSUs.  Several OBU 
densities were used to examine whether the factor was sensitive to vehicle density.  Each 
case was run with 10, 25, 50, 100, 250, and 500 OBUs.  The level for each factor that 
resulted in the lowest time for all OBUs to complete the CRL download was selected as 
the level to use in the trace mobility simulation runs.  This level is referred to as the most 
effective level. 
7.7.1 Randomness of Piece Selection 
 The first experiment conducted helped to determine the method for selecting 
which CRL file piece to broadcast.  This factor applied to all four distribution methods, 
and both RSUs and OBUs.  During each SCH interval, nodes broadcast CRL file pieces 
based on the method of CRL distribution.  The selection of which piece to broadcast was 
accomplished using two different methods, a random selection method and a type of 
random permutation where a piece is not selected again until all other pieces have been 
selected.  We anticipated that the random permutation method will result in lower 
download times since more worthwhile pieces are broadcast more frequently.  OBUs 
have far fewer pieces to select for broadcast, so the methods where every OBU 
broadcasts pieces is expected to have higher download times.   
Table 7.  Experiment factors. 
Factor name Levels 
Piece Selection random, random permutation 
Packet Size 500, 1000, 1500 
GPC Channel Selection Random, Stay on 




7.7.2 Piece Size 
 The second experiment evaluated three different piece sizes for all nodes to use.  
The size of the pieces was also the size of the payload of the packets used in the 
simulation.  Piece sizes of 500, 1000, and 1500 bytes were tested.  While smaller pieces 
require less time to broadcast than larger pieces, there is a constant packet overhead that 
reduces the overall throughput when using small packets.  However, larger packets are 
more susceptible to collisions, noise, radio fading, and other factors that reduce the 
number of packets received. 
 While the piece size could have remained fixed at 500 bytes and multiple pieces 
sent in each packet, using larger pieces is effectively the same.  Instead of sending 3 500-
byte pieces in a single 1500-byte packet, a single 1500-byte piece was sent in a 1500-byte 
packet.  The number of pieces needed is dependent on the piece size and the file size.  We 
used a fixed file size of 1,000,000 bytes for the CRL.  The number of pieces needed 
based on a coding overhead of 5% for different piece sizes is shown in Table 8.  4000 file 
pieces were generated by the CA regardless of the piece size used. 
7.7.3 GPC Channel Selection 
 The third experiment examined the way the GPC method selects from which 
service channel to download pieces.  The GPC method requires the OBUs to spend time 
on different service channels to download the generations of the CRL file.  As discussed 
in chapter 6.2, GPC can either randomly select a service channel each interval, or stay on 
a particular service channel until the generation is fully downloaded.  We anticipated that 











the vehicle density will influence this level.  When the number of vehicles is less dense, 
the random channel selection will enable a better distribution of pieces.  However, as the 
vehicle density increases, more vehicles are available per channel with which to 
exchange pieces. 
7.7.4 Number of GPC Channels 
 The next experiment determines how many service channels to use for the GPC 
method.  The number of generations of the CRL file is equal to the number of service 
channels used.  With six service channels available in DSRC, we evaluated the 
performance of two, four, and six service channels to determine which level downloaded 
the entire CRL in the least amount of time.  There is a trade-off between reducing the 
number of nodes contending for the channel and having to spend time on more channels.  
The number of OBUs contending for the same service channel is reduced by a factor of 
the number of service channels used in this method.  If RSUs are available to the OBU, it 
could potentially receive the entire generation during the time it takes to drive through the 
RSUs radio footprint if the OBU stayed on the same service channel. 
7.7.5 Comparison of Methods Using the Trace Mobility Model 
 The culminating experiment compares the number of nodes that successfully 
download the CRL during a 300 second time period using three different trace mobility 
models.  All four methods, RSU-only, Code Torrent, MPB and GPC, were simulated on 
the three different trace mobility models described in chapter 7.5.2.  The levels from the 
first four experiments were used to reduce the number of combinations of factors and 
levels since each replication of the 1275 and 1705 OBU traces required in excess of 12 
hours of computing time.  Ten replications of each of the four methods for each of the 





 The results of the simulation are discussed in this chapter, both for the bouncing 
box scenario and the three mobility trace scenarios. 
8.1 Evaluation Criteria 
8.1.1 CRL Download Time 
 For the bouncing box models, the simulation was run until all n OBUs completed 
the download of the CRL file.  The time of download completion for each OBU was 
recorded.  The time for the final OBU to complete is treated as the completion time for 
the simulation run.  When compared to another method, lower completion times indicate 
that the method performed better than the other method. 
 For the trace mobility models, the simulation was run for 300 seconds of 
simulation clock time, which was the length of the mobility trace.  The completion time 
of each OBU receiving the complete CRL was recorded.  At the end of the 300 seconds 
the total number of OBUs completing the download was recorded.  When compared to 
another method, a higher number of OBUs completing the CRL download indicate that 
the method performed better than the other method. 
 The times and number of OBUs complete are used as evaluation criteria.  In each 
case, statistical analysis is required to determine if the differences between the methods 
are statistically significant. 
8.1.2 Number of Pieces Transmitted and Received 
 The total number of pieces transmitted by the physical layer and received by the 
application layer during the service channel intervals by the RSUs and the OBUs was 
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recorded.  The number of pieces received by each OBU until the OBU completed the 
CRL file download was also recorded.  These data points are used to evaluate two 
different evaluation criteria, the Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), and the Normalized Packet 
Overhead (NPO) [78]. 
 PDR is defined as 
 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑑  𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑡𝑕𝑒  𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠  𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑡𝑕𝑒  𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
. (9) 
A PDR value greater than one is possible in the case where a single broadcaster sends 
pieces to several listening nodes, as in the RSU-only model.  Higher values of PDR 
indicate that the method is achieving a higher effective throughput on the medium.  Very 
low numbers indicate a high number of dropped packets due to collisions in the medium, 
or it could indicate a low ratio of receivers to transmitters.  The PDR value for the RSU-
only scenario can be used as a rough estimate for vehicle density since the RSUs are the 
only broadcasters and the OBUs are the only receivers. 
 NPO is defined as 
 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐶𝑅𝐿  𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠  𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐶𝑅𝐿  𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠  𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑑  𝑡𝑜  𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟  𝑡𝑕𝑒  𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒
. (10) 
An NPO value of one indicates that every piece received was used to recover the CRL 
file.  Numbers greater than one indicate that duplicate pieces were received.  The NPO 
value is an average of all of the individual OBU pieces downloaded to receive the CRL. 
8.2 Statistical Analysis 
 Statistical analysis was completed to compare the results of each method to the 
results of the other methods.  This was accomplished using the methods described in [77, 
79-81] for correlated sampling, or common random numbers.  The same random number 
seed was used throughout all simulation runs, and the run number was advanced to use 
the next sub-stream of random numbers, per [82].  This synchronizes the random 
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numbers to reduce variance between different methods of CRL distribution.  In particular, 
the mobility of the OBUs is the same for every method on each of the independent 
replications with the same run number.  The paired-t comparison requires correlated 
sampling and independent replications. 
 Each experiment is run for several replications to find several samples (Y) for the 
experimental criteria, namely time or number of OBUs completed, and pieces received 
and transmitted.  The next step is comparing each of the experiments to each other.  Since 
correlated sampling is used, the difference between results for each method is found and 
then averaged, resulting in the average difference between the methods, 𝐷  (11), and the 
variance of the difference, 𝑆𝐷
2  (12).  Here R is the total number of replications and r 




 (𝑌𝑟1 − 𝑌𝑟2)
𝑅
𝑟=1  (11) 
 𝑆𝐷
2 =  
1
𝑅−1
  (𝐷𝑟 − 𝐷 )
2𝑅
𝑟=1  (12) 
 The null hypothesis, H0, is that the two means of the different methods are the 
same; thus the difference of the means would be zero, as shown in (13).  The alternative 
hypothesis, Ha, where the means are different, indicates that difference between the 
methods is statistically significant at the specified confidence interval, (1 − α), shown in 
(14).  A confidence interval of 95% was used throughout this study. 
 H0: 𝐷  = 0, (13) 
 Ha: 𝐷  ≠ 0 (14) 
 The number of samples and the sample variance of the two compared experiments 
are used to find the half-width of the difference between the means using (15).  The value 
of 0.05 is used for α, resulting in a 95% confidence interval for the half-width.  The 
number of samples (simulation runs) for each experiment (R) is used to determine the 
degrees of freedom for the student-t distribution. 
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 𝑕𝑎𝑙𝑓 − 𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡𝑕 =  𝑡1−𝛼
2





 The half width is then used with the difference of the sample means to determine 
if the experiments have a significant statistical difference.  If 𝐷  ± 𝑕𝑎𝑙𝑓 − 𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡𝑕 
contains zero, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, indicating that there is not 
sufficient evidence that the experiments produced different means, i.e., that they are not 
different. 
8.3 Factor Experiment Results 
 The results from the experiments to determine the most effective level of the four 
factors are discussed in detail below.  Table 9 summarizes the results of the best factor 
levels as determined by the earlier simulation results. 
Table 9.  Most effective levels per factor. 
Factor name Selected factor level 
Piece Selection Random permutation 
Packet Size 1000 
GPC Channel Selection Random 
Number of GPC Channels  6 
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8.3.1 Randomness of Piece Selection 
 The piece selection method that is most effective across the different vehicle 
densities is the random permutation method.  While the methods perform essentially the 
same, there is some statistical difference in favor of the random permutation method.  
Specifically, the random permutation method outperforms the random method at the 500 
OBU density level for both Code Torrent and MPB.  The average download times are 
shown in Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19.  Effect of piece selection on download time. 





































8.3.2 Piece Size 
 The piece size that is the most effective across the different vehicle densities is the 
1000-byte piece size.  While the difference between the 1000-byte piece and the other 
sizes is not statistically significant at every density, the 1000-byte piece size does perform 
at least as good as the other packet sizes at every density level for both Code Torrent and 
MPB except at the 500 OBU case of MPB, where the 500-byte piece size statistically 
outperforms the other piece sizes.  The difference 500-1000 and 500-1500 at that level is 









































8.3.3 GPC Channel Selection 
 The GPC channel selection method that is most effective across the different 
vehicle densities is the random channel selection method.  There is significant statistical 
difference in favor of the random channel selection method for all OBU densities except 
for the 10 and 25 OBU densities, where there is no statistical difference between the 
methods.  The average download times are shown in Figure 21.  There is no significant 
statistical difference in the PDR values for this factor 
 
 




































2 Ch, Stay On
2 Ch, Random
4 Ch, Stay On
4 Ch, Random
6 Ch, Stay On
6 Ch, Random
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8.3.4 Number of GPC Channels 
 The number of GPC channels that is most effective across the different vehicle 
densities is six.  There is strong statistical difference in favor of the 6-channel model for 
all OBU densities except for the 10 and 25 OBU densities, where there is no significant 
difference between the methods.  The average download times are shown in Figure 22 at 
the top.  There is statistical difference in the PDR values for this factor.  For lower OBU 
densities, the 2-channel model has the highest PDR, but as the OBU density increases 
above 250 OBUs, the 6-channel model has the highest PDR. 
 






























































8.4 Trace Mobility Model Results 
 Using the most effective levels for the piece selection method, piece size, GPC 
channel selection, and the number of service channels for GPC, the four CRL distribution 
models were each simulated using three different simulated vehicle traces.  The total 
number of OBUs receiving the complete CRL over the 300 second trace is shown, as is 
the packet delivery ratio (PDR) of pieces received divided by the pieces transmitted, and 
the normalized packet overhead (NPO) of number of pieces received divided by the 
number of pieces needed.  Higher numbers are better for OBU count and PDR, lower 
numbers are better for NPO. 
8.4.1 Results from the 520 OBU Network 
 The results from 10 replications using the trace file Enge-Oberstrass with four 
RSUs and 520 OBUs show that MPB distributes the CRL to the most number of OBUs, 
outperforming GPC6 by 18.7 ± 1.1.  MPB had the highest PDR aside from the RSU-only 
case and 26% fewer packet transmissions than Code Torrent and 78% fewer than GPC6.  
Figure 23, Figure 24, and Figure 25 show the results from this experiment. 
 


































 The number of OBUs that downloaded partial CRLs using the GPC6 method is 
11.2 ± 1.6.  This means that on average another 11 OBUs would have access to some 
parts of the CRL that were downloaded as independent generations, offering some 
protection to those OBUs. 
  
 
Figure 24.  Packet deliver ratio and normalized packet overhead for OBUs from Enge-
Oberstrass with 520 OBUs. 
 
 
RSU CT MPB GPC6
PDR 9.480 3.753 4.614 0.731













































8.4.2 Results from the 1705 OBU Network 
 The results from 10 replications using the trace file Enge-Oberstrass with four 
RSUs and 1705 OBUs show that MPB and GPC6 perform almost the same; however, 
MPB does distribute the CRL to 5.0 ± 1.9 more OBUs during the simulation.  MPB also 
has the highest PDR aside from the RSU-only case.  MPB had 32% fewer packet 
transmissions than Code Torrent and 80% fewer than GPC6.  Figure 26, Figure 27, and 
Figure 28 show the results from this experiment.  RSU-only outperformed CT by 199.9 ± 
7.0. 
 GPC6 and MPB continue to perform well at the increased vehicle density levels 
since the number of OBUs contending for the channel is reduced; however, Code Torrent 
shows that it does not scale well to higher vehicle densities, resulting in a much lower 
number of OBUs completing the CRL download.  This occurs when OBUs that only have 
a small number of pieces contend for the channel with OBUs that have a large number of 
pieces.  This has the effect of reducing the number of new pieces available for 
distribution during a service channel interval.  The high Normalized Packet Overhead 
(NPO) value for CT shows quantitatively that multiple duplicate pieces are received 
 
































during the CRL download process. 
 The number of OBUs that downloaded partial CRLs using the GPC6 method is 
33.4 ± 4.7.  This means that on average another 33 OBUs would have access to some 
parts of the CRL that were downloaded as independent generations, offering some 
protection to those OBUs.  
 



































Figure 27.  Packet deliver ratio and normalized packet overhead for OBUs from Enge-
Oberstrass with 1705 OBUs. 
 
 
RSU CT MPB GPC6
PDR 36.717 7.066 10.302 1.896












8.4.3 Results from the 1275 OBU Network 
 The results from 10 replications using the trace file Hurgen-Jona with four RSUs 
and 1275 OBUs show that MPB and GPC6 perform very similarly; however, MPB does 
distribute the CRL to 17.8 ± 1.8 more OBUs during the simulation.  MPB also has the 
highest PDR aside from the RSU-only case.  MPB had 33% fewer packet transmissions 
than Code Torrent and 83% fewer than GPC6.  This is the first OBU density-level where 
Code Torrent performed worse than RSU-only, confirming our expectation that at a 
certain vehicle density Code Torrent would no longer perform well because of the high 
number of OBUs contending for the channel to participate in the piece exchange.  At this 
vehicle density, RSU-only outperforms Code Torrent by a difference of 69.5 ± 5.9 OBUs 
receiving the CRL.  Figure 29, Figure 30, and Figure 31 show the results from this 
experiment.   
 The number of OBUs that downloaded partial CRLs using the GPC method is 
15.2 ± 3.2.  This means that on average another 15 OBUs would have access to some 
parts of the CRL that were downloaded as independent generations, offering some 
protection to those OBUs. 
 
 


































Figure 30.  Packet deliver ratio and normalized packet overhead for OBUs from Hurgen-
Jona with 1275 OBUs. 
RSU CT MPB GPC
PDR 42.551 9.516 14.110 2.324
















































8.5 Comparison of Results 
 Overall, MPB distributed the CRL to the most number of OBUs with the least 
amount of network resources.  MPB consistently distributed the CRL to the highest 
number of OBUs during each vehicle trace simulation, as shown in the top of Figure 32.  
GPC-6 exhibited completion levels similar to MPB, but at a higher resource requirement, 
using additional service channels and generating higher levels of network traffic.   Code 
Torrent did not scale well to higher vehicle density levels due to increasing levels of 
channel contention and the reduced number of new pieces available for distribution.  
 







































































 The purpose of this research was to investigate improved CRL distribution 
methods for VANETs.  The two CRL distribution methods developed in this research, 
Most Pieces Broadcast and Generation per Channel, both outperform the existing 
methods of RSU-only and Code Torrent for the total number of OBUs that receive the 
CRL file during a fixed time period.  MPB and GPC outperform Code Torrent because 
the number of OBUs attempting to broadcast pieces during the service channel interval is 
significantly reduced.  MPB and GPC outperform RSU-only because vehicle to vehicle 
communication is used so that OBUs can exchange CRL pieces outside of RSU radio 
range. 
 MPB requires only a single service channel, while the GPC evaluated in this study 
requires the use of all six service channels to achieve the higher download rate.  Use of 
all six service channels may not be an option once VANETs are implemented.  Thus, our 
recommendation is for MPB as the better of the two methods developed, since the 
amount of network traffic is reduced while still distributing the CRL effectively to a 
majority of the VANET users. 
 Coding methods should be used to distribute large files, such as the CRL, in a 
VANET environment.  Raptor coding has several advantages over network coding in 
VANETs, including reduced overhead for tracking pieces and increased security of 
pieces through authentication and integrity checks since each piece is cryptographically 
signed by the CA. 
 The concept of splitting a large CRL into stand-alone "generations" as was done 
in the GPC method is effective in providing some parts of the CRL without having to 
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download the entire file.  This concept becomes more important as the size of the CRL 
grows larger.  While this does not directly reduce the overall size of the CRL, it does 
reduce the amount of information that must be received before being able to use some of 
the information. 
 Another recommendation is to adopt the "Valid After" field to limit the lifetime of 
pseudonyms.  This allows an OBU to store pseudonyms for future use that are not 
immediately valid. 
9.2 Future Work 
 The two main methods of reducing the download time we discussed were 
reducing the contention on the channel and reducing the size of the CRL.  While this 
research focused more on reducing the channel contention, there are some ways to reduce 
the CRL size that would also be interesting to examine. 
9.2.1 Method for Reducing Channel Contention 
 GPC and Code Torrent both transmitted several times more pieces than were 
received.  One of the primary reasons for this is collisions due to several OBUs trying to 
broadcast during the same contention window slot time.  One way to reduce the number 
of OBUs attempting to broadcast would be to limit the rate at which they transmit pieces.  
This can be accomplished by assigning a probabilistic forwarding rate for the OBUs in 
the case where every node broadcasts.  This could be applied to the Code Torrent model 
and the GPC model, which uses Code Torrent on the separate service channels.  [49] 
looked at this briefly, varying the forwarding rate of the nodes.  They saw that as node 
density increased, the forwarding rate needed to decrease to allow data to flow better.  
This could be done by adding a probability for each OBU to send pieces.  There may be 
some ratio of nodes per channel that produces the best throughput, so the forwarding rate 
could be based on this ratio.  This could possibly even work to scale the broadcast rate 
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higher in cases of low vehicle density.  [60, 83] consider probabilistic forwarding in more 
detail.  There may be also be a way to link the vehicle density to the number of service 
channels used.  As the vehicle density increases, more channels can be used.  Combining 
probabilistic forwarding with the number of channels used may lead to the least amount 
of congestion since it would reduce the number of broadcasters to the lowest values. 
 Another way to reduce DSRC channel contention is to examine other means of 
communication to distribute the CRL, such as AM/FM radio, WiMax, cellular, or 
satellite.  Vehicles already have several receivers available that could be used in addition 
to DSRC.  Since obtaining the CRL is almost purely a matter of file download, the lack 
of a transmitter on the alternate bands does not inhibit CRL distribution.  Also, since the 
CRL is signed by the CA to guarantee file integrity, the broadcast medium does not have 
to be secure. 
9.2.2 Method for Reducing the CRL Size 
 Further research in the trade-offs between CRL size and management complexity 
due to CA region size is needed.  One way to reduce the CRL size is to distribute regional 
CRLs.  The use of specific generations or service channels for different CRL regions may 
aide in reducing the management complexity of regional CRLs.  The generations could 
have priorities based on proximity to where the revocation was triggered.  This format 
would also be portable from one region to another since the generation distributed as 
lower priority in one region could be issued identically but with a different priority in a 
different region.  This would allow for possibly intelligent download based on the vehicle 
destination, e.g., if a vehicle were traveling south the owner may not be as concerned 
about revocation information for northern destinations.  A channel priority guide could be 
used in every region, such as channel 172 always having the highest priority CRL 
generation, with four other service channels distributing CRL generations for each of the 
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four cardinal directions one region away.  This would also help reduce the size of the 
immediately needed CRL. 
9.2.3 Other Factors 
 While not directly reducing channel contention, one way for MPB to achieve a 
higher CRL completion rate might involve having slightly more OBUs broadcast during 
the service channel intervals.  GPC was successful at distributing the CRL on several 
service channels, possibly due to having more broadcasters with a greater variety of 
pieces to exchange.  Instead of having only the one OBU with the most pieces broadcast, 
it would be interesting to evaluate if allowing the N OBUs with the most pieces 
broadcast, adapting MPB to "Top N Broadcast." 
 The current versions of the WAVE standards specify a 50% duty cycle between 
the control channel interval and the service channel interval.  We noticed that only a 
small fraction of the control channel interval was used to communicate beacons.  It would 
be interesting to study if more time could be given to the service channels to increase the 
amount of data transferred during a complete synch interval. 
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APPENDIX A   
NS-2 MOBILITY TRACE CONVERTER 
 The mobility trace files used in this simulation were from a project by Naumov, 
Baumann and Gross, in 2006 [68].  The traces were developed using the Multi-agent 
Microscopic Traffic Simulator (MMTS) developed at ETH Zurich, Switzerland [84, 85].  
The original trace file has 259,978 vehicles traveling in an area of 354 kilometers by 263 
kilometers for 76,603 seconds.  The original trace is divided into different geographic 
regions for time blocks of 300 seconds.  Several different city and highway models are 
available, each with low, medium, and high vehicle density.  Each trace begins with an 
explanation of the trace, including map size, number of vehicles, and length of time the 
trace runs.  The complete header is shown in Figure 33.  The header information also 
includes the original trace the file was taken from. 
 The Switzerland traces [67] could not be used directly in ns-3 since the traces 
were developed for ns-2.  The ns-3 file Ns2MobilityHelper interprets ns-2 mobility file 
 
# Statistics: 
# T_min: 0.000000 T_max: 300.030000 
# X_min: 10 X_max: 8510 
# Y_min: 10 Y_max: 4510 
# V_min: 2.436752 V_max: 32.441287 V_avg: 13.675002 
# nn: 1275 area: 38250000.000000  
# events: 8890 hosts/area: 0.333333 
# Last mov would end time at (time): 457.020 
# 
# Processed from file: hw-ct-hurgen-jona-1day.filt.0.mov 
# ADJUSTMENT: X_min=699490.0 Y_min=229490.0 T_min=25359.980000 
T_max= T_scalar=1 
 
Figure 33.  Trace file header information. 
 90 
data in the form of  
 (x.velocity, y.velocity, z.velocity). (16) 
The Switzerland trace files were in an alternate data format of  
 (x.position, y.position, velocity). (17) 
Additionally, specific ns-2 commands were in the trace files to control the wireless 
interface of the OBU.  These commands were not recognizable to the ns-3 interpreter file.  
A sample of the trace file is shown in Figure 34. 
 Thus, some parsing of the trace files was required, as well as writing an ns-3 
interpreter of the ns-2 trace format.  Fortunately, an ns-3 contributor (Francesco 
Malandrino) had made significant progress on an ns-2 trace interpreter, 
Ns2WaypointMobilityHelper, so only minor work was needed to make it compatible with 
the Switzerland traces.  Mr. Malandrino's file parsed the alternate ns-2 trace format in the 
form of (17) and converted to the form of (16) and passed the converted values to the 
original Ns2MobilityHelper file. 
 The first improvement we made to the program included turning wireless 
$ns_ at 0.0 "$node_(794) switch OFF" # set_X,Y,Z   
$node_(794) set X_ 0.000000 
$node_(794) set Y_ 0.000000 
$node_(794) set Z_ 0.0 
$ns_ at 32.010000 "$node_(794) setdest 4970.000000 2970.000000 
1000000000.000000" # init_node 
$ns_ at 32.020000 "$node_(794) switch ON" # inside   
$ns_ at 32.020000 "$node_(794) setdest 5381.624912 3248.704367 13.639450" #  
$ns_ at 32.020000 "$node_(294) setdest 10.000000 2939.138577 12.486172" #  
$ns_ at 57.948750 "$node_(294) switch OFF" # leaving_area   
$ns_ at 32.020000 "$node_(310) setdest 3571.896934 3462.382148 10.533557" #  
$ns_ at 32.020000 "$node_(124) setdest 4270.000000 1290.000000 9.418602" #  
$ns_ at 32.020000 "$node_(424) setdest 4650.000000 1770.000000 2.858696" #  
$ns_ at 32.020000 "$node_(234) setdest 4970.000000 2970.000000 12.499433" # 
 
Figure 34.  Sample from trace file hw-ct-hurgen-jona-1day.high.0.adj.mov. 
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interfaces on and off.  This simulates the situation when OBUs enter and leave the 
boundaries of the simulation as well as when OBUs arrive at their destination and turn off 
the car, effectively leaving the simulation.  The following two lines of code schedule the 







 The next improvement deals with cleaning up the mobility paths of the vehicles in 
the trace file.  In the conversion from the form in (17) to the form of (16), round-off 
errors and position inconsistencies were introduced into the vehicle paths, resulting in a 
 
Figure 35.  Comparison of vehicle locations from the original trace file, the current ns-
2 trace reader, and the improved ns-2 trace reader. 
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"fuzzy" mobility output.  These deviations from the trace file were corrected by ensuring 
that events were scheduled in the correct order and by correcting the location to the 
specified destination of the trace file, introducing minor corrections to positions.  The 
result of the "clear" mobility output is shown in Figure 35, along with the locations 
specified in the trace file and the "fuzzy" output. 
 The improvement to the interpreter also ensured that node mobility was 
continuous instead of having discontinuities in the motion.  This is shown in Figure 36.  
The trace on the left shows several places where the node stopped and then moved 
instantaneously to a new location.  By ensuring that stops and starts were scheduled in the 
correct order from the original trace file, the trace on the right shows continuous mobility 
by the node, as intended by the original trace file.  
 
Figure 36:  Mobility trace from the output of ns-3 for a single node. 
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